

CURRENT HISTORY

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Current History

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In this issue, seven specialists examine how the nations of North Africa are poised to meet the challenges of the 1990's. As our introductory article notes: "Few observers believe that the liberal initiatives of the mid-1980's will bring full-scale political democracy to North Africa in the short run. . . . Nonetheless, there is considerable room for tempered optimism."

Liberalism in Northern Africa

BY LISA ANDERSON

Associate Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

THE last several years have witnessed remarkable changes in the political atmosphere of North Africa; these developments are particularly striking in the predictable light of North African politics through the early 1980's. In Tunisia, the preceding decade had seen fruitless jockeying among the elite for top positions in the anticipated succession to aging President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba. In Libya, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi had single-mindedly pursued the idiosyncratic revolution that he had launched after coming to power in 1969. In Algeria, President Chadli Bendjedid had continued most of the single-party socialist policies he inherited in 1979. In Morocco, in 1983 King Hassan II once again had postponed scheduled parliamentary elections.

Then, as the middle of the decade passed, the picture changed suddenly. In September, 1984, Morocco held long-awaited elections, returning a more diverse and more representative group of parliamentarians. In September, 1987, Qaddafi lifted some restrictions on private economic activity that his revolution had dictated earlier; soon thereafter professionals, notably doctors, were allowed to resume private practice. In November, 1987, Tunisian Prime Minister Zine Abdine Ben Ali deposed President Bourguiba; within a year he had released most of the country's political prisoners, expanded

press freedoms and permitted the formation of several new political parties.

In Algeria, President Bendjedid responded to riots in October, 1988, by sacking his Prime Minister and initiating a program of political reform that would lead to the recognition of several opposition political parties by the summer of 1989.

Several factors influenced the political initiatives undertaken by the rulers of North Africa. Clearly, the international environment for political reform and liberalization was more favorable than at virtually any time since World War II. The administrations of United States Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan had emphasized human rights and democratization; Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's pursuit of glasnost and perestroika also contributed to a worldwide atmosphere conducive to liberalization. Private movements in the Arab world, notably the establishment in 1983 of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, have given support to local human rights activists and have encouraged government moves toward political liberalization.¹

There were also fears within the regimes themselves that political conservatism and political repression were increasingly ineffective responses to popular demands. Rulers throughout the Muslim world were being warned that the absence of political liberties could contribute to building constituencies for illegal opposition politics, particularly Islamist movements. Perhaps more important, it had become apparent to most of the Arab world, including North Africa, that because of the easy availability of foreign revenues, once-vigorous authoritarian governments had grown complacent and lost touch with their populations. These governments could no longer afford the luxury of irrespon-

¹The literature on the human rights organizations in the Arab world is not vast, but the organizations are increasingly important. Four North African countries have human rights organizations, several of which—particularly in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia—have been effective in calling attention to government violations. See Liesl Graz, "Campaigning for Human Rights in the Arab World," *Middle East International*, no. 364 (December 1, 1989); Naseer Aruri, "Disaster Area: Human Rights in the Arab World," *MERIP Reports*, no. 149 (November-December 1987).

sibility: the need for economic reform had grown urgent.

Qaddafi, for example, was long accustomed to limitless state revenues; he had been distracted from the domestic consequences of the belt-tightening required by the declining revenues of the 1980's by the drama and excitement of his confrontation with the United States. The lull in United States-Libyan hostilities after the United States bombing of Libya in 1986 revealed that domestic opposition could not be attributed to American instigation, but was based on economic grievances—particularly against food shortages and the inadequate government services exacerbated by declining oil revenues.

In Tunisia, attention to the political ramifications of economic problems was equally inadequate during most of the 1980's. The political elite around the aging Bourguiba attempted merely to retain power in morbid anticipation of the President's demise, which contributed to growing alienation and cynicism. In Algeria, the political elite addressed itself to economic reform, but not to the effect of the reform on the daily lives of the people. Although President Bendjedid had made some tentative efforts in the direction of liberalization during the mid-1980s—recognizing the Algerian League of Human Rights, for example—the single ruling party, the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), remained unchallenged; and it had grown conservative, elitist and corrupt. In Morocco, staggering income disparities increased as the government attempted to divert attention from economic grievances with a nationalist campaign to regain the former Spanish territories in the Western Sahara.

In all these countries, the political elite came to recognize that further economic growth might require still greater popular sacrifice, prompting experiments with political liberalization. In order to solicit advice in developing economic strategies, to enlist support for the inevitable austerity measures and to reach agreements over how reduced government resources could be apportioned, these governments relaxed the authoritarian policies and centralized policy-making that had contributed to unrest and experimented instead with institutionalized competition in the market and in politics.

THE ECONOMIC DILEMMAS

To understand how and why the governments of North Africa (particularly the erstwhile populist regimes in Libya, Tunisia and Algeria) had so lost touch with their populations that they might face mutinies in the barracks and riots in the streets, the

process that began at independence (or, in the Libyan case, with Qaddafi's accession to power in 1969) must be examined. As the rulers spent their early years in power consolidating control, eliminating opponents and installing and strengthening ambitious public administrations, they took the existence of a popular following for granted. In Morocco, King Hassan II emphasized his dynastic and religious claims to authority and allegiance, while the other rulers emphasized their credentials as leaders of nationalist movements and popular revolutions to legitimate their control.

The rulers of North Africa assumed popular support in the early years not only because the causes with which they associated themselves were genuinely popular, but also because they were beneficiaries of economic windfalls. Until very recently, these governments were able to obtain substantial funds without taxing their own populations. Algeria and Libya profited from oil and gas reserves; Morocco and Tunisia benefited from significant phosphate deposits. Most important, because of the nationalization of foreign-owned properties at independence, generous foreign aid allotments, and willing lenders in public and private international banking circles, these regimes obtained financing for many domestic projects without making demands on their citizens. Indeed (particularly under the populist governments of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya), the efforts to improve the lot of the people and to consolidate popular acquiescence in the rule of the incumbent governments encouraged the creation and distribution of free entitlements like educational facilities, food subsidies, housing allotments and medical allowances that would ultimately prove to be expensive to the state and costly to the people.

The countries of North Africa were, in essence, preindustrial welfare states, borrowing against their natural resources, strategic positions and historical legacies to feed and clothe their growing populations.² The disproportionate share of government budgets derived from sources outside domestic production permitted governments to pursue policy without consulting domestic interest groups that would ordinarily be the source of government revenues, like taxpaying wage earners and property owners. Indeed, the rulers were obliged only by moral responsibility or ideological commitment—and not by fiscal requirements—to increase the national wealth through enhanced agricultural productivity and industrialization. As a result, they were relatively insensitive to the changing character of the domestic population (its increasing youth, for example, or its higher level of education and growing rates of unemployment) and to the sometimes deleterious results of the policies they did advocate.

²This was not peculiar to North Africa; rather, it characterizes many of the states of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa as well.

For example, by the beginning of the 1980's, Tunisia had reached the end of 25 years of growth by expansion. From the dramatic increase in the government bureaucracy after the French withdrawal in 1955 to reliance on foreign investment in the 1970's, Tunisia had been able to enlarge its economic pie without having to redivide it: per capita income had risen in constant dollars from U.S.\$300 in 1956 to U.S.\$1,300 in 1983, despite the doubling of the population to 7. million. In fact, uneven income distribution worsened during the 1970's; unemployment was unofficially estimated at 50 percent among men under the age of 25; and by the 1980's, the economic growth rate had dropped to 4.5 percent. Further growth would require austerity and probably structural overhaul to rectify accumulated imbalances in the economy.

As in all North African countries, agricultural production needed to be increased through land reform; the archaic tax credit and finance structures required revision; and consumer goods subsidies, which consumed one-fourth of the government budget, had to be lifted. These measures were easy to advocate but exceedingly difficult to implement. Bread consumers who relied on the wheat subsidies, businessmen who contributed to Tunisia's estimated 80 percent tax-evasion rate and landholders who controlled the 3 percent of the farms that covered half the country's agricultural land all constituted powerful constituencies for the status quo.³

For Algeria, similar economic problems had been obscured by the revenues provided by substantial oil and gas exports during the 1970's. Despite a generous agricultural endowment, the country imported half its food; agricultural productivity was hobbled by both the neglect and the collectivization that was a hallmark of Algerian socialism. By the mid-1980's, the economy's real growth rate hovered around 2 percent, well below the 3.1 percent annual population increase. The dramatic declines in oil and gas prices in the mid-1980's halved the country's foreign income, and only with

severe belt-tightening—imports were cut 50 percent between 1986 and 1988—did Algeria avoid rescheduling its external debt.⁴

In Libya, popular discontent with government inefficiency was long-standing, but unhappiness increased in the mid-1980's as basic consumer goods grew scarce. In 1987 and 1988, Libya earned little more than U.S.\$6 billion for its oil exports, less than one-third of its income in the late 1970's. While some of the resulting austerity was born by the tens of thousands of foreign workers who were sent home during the first half of the 1980's, shortages in the largely imported food supply affected the Libyan consumer directly.⁵

Although the Moroccan government had made fewer implicit or explicit promises to its people, it faced similar dilemmas. Morocco had retained a substantial private sector throughout the 1960's and 1970's, when other countries committed themselves to egalitarian policies under the guise of socialism. Conspicuous consumption by wealthy Moroccans was encouraged by the King, who is one of the richest men in the world. The commitment to private enterprise was selective, however—the state owns or controls the phosphate companies, the railroads, the national airline, several major banks and so forth—and it systematically favored the well-endowed. In the early 1980's, the World Bank estimated that well over 40 percent of the Moroccan people were living below the absolute poverty level.⁶

A noted observer of North Africa, Francis Ghilles, summed up the economic picture in 1988:

As Libya's maverick leader [Qaddafi] . . . rediscovers the virtues of private retailing after years of an economic policy which has left the shops in his oil-rich country with nothing to sell except basic foodstuffs, Algeria is implementing a bold policy of selling off state land to private farmers and slowly freeing its export policies. At the same time, Tunisia is pushing through a package of reforms agreed with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] faster than any of its Maghrib [Maghreb] peers; and Morocco is facing up to the simple truth that as long as its entrepreneurs pay neither personal nor company tax, the state will be in no position to raise the level of education.⁷

THE POLITICAL CRISES

Not surprisingly, the unbalanced economic change of the preceding decades, the exhaustion of external sources of revenue and the demand for structural economic readjustment produced political dilemmas throughout North Africa. In Morocco, it was partly the vociferous popular complaints being voiced by the political parties that provoked King Hassan to postpone parliamentary elections

³Hassine Dimassi, "La crise économique en Tunisie: une crise de régulation," *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 103 (January-March, 1984); *Financial Times*, January 5-9, 1984.

⁴On the Algerian economy and polity, see Francis Ghilles, "Chadli Benjedid's Economic Reforms," *Middle East International*, no. 319 (February 20, 1988); Rachid Tlemcani and William Hansen, "Development and the State in Post-Colonial Algeria," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 24, nos. 1-2 (1989); George Joffe, "The Background to the Riots in Algeria," *Middle East International*, no. 336 (October 21, 1988).

⁵Judith Miller, "Tide of Foreign Workers Is Flowing out of Libya," *The New York Times*, September 29, 1984.

⁶David Seddon, "Winter of Discontent: Economic Crisis in Tunisia and Morocco," *MERIP Reports*, no. 127 (October, 1984), p. 13.

⁷"The Imperatives Pushing North Africa Towards Unity," *Middle East International*, no. 331 (August 5, 1988), p. 19.

twice in the early 1980's. In Libya, although the popular appeal of the organized opposition was undermined by its association with American support during much of the 1980's, recurrent reports of acts of defiance—from defaced posters of Qaddafi on university campuses to military mutinies and assassination attempts—suggested that Qaddafi faced serious disaffection at home.

In both Tunisia and Algeria, the ruling parties were no longer able to represent all the increasingly divergent interests in society. Some movements that challenged the ruling parties, like Tunisia's *Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes* (MDS), were offshoots of the ruling party itself or, like the *Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie* (MDA) founded by ex-President Ahmed Ben Bella, were groups based on former regime members. Other movements, like Tunisia's *Mouvement de Tendance Islamique* (MTI) and Algeria's *Front Islamique de Salut* (FIS), reflected the political maturation of a generation for whom the old slogans of the struggle for independence were tiresome history while Islam provided a vibrant idiom for their hopes and grievances.⁸

Tensions in Morocco had reached a boiling point in January, 1984. IMF-dictated austerity measures had already been imposed and had apparently been received with equanimity the previous summer, but when the government announced higher prices for basic commodities and a steep increase in school fees, secondary school students went on strike and the country was soon engulfed in rioting. Between 150 and 200 people died and thousands were arrested when the security forces restored order; King Hassan was forced to rescind the price increases. The government and the people subsequently found themselves in a stalemate, able only to veto one another's demands.

The impetus to liberalization in Libya, in contrast, was less a single event than an accumulation of reverses suffered by the government. During the winter of 1986 and the spring of 1987, Libyan forces suffered a series of defeats in Chad; in August, Chadian forces—who (while they were well-supplied by Western countries opposed to Qaddafi) were portrayed in the international media as rag-tag bands of patriots—attacked a major air base inside Libya. This was acutely embarrassing to Qaddafi, both domestically and internationally, and the poor performance of his military contributed to a wide-ranging reevaluation of government policy.

⁸Susan Waltz, "Islamist Appeal in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 40, no. 4 (Autumn, 1986).

⁹See L.B. Ware, "Ben Ali's Constitutional Coup in Tunisia," and Dirk Vanderwalle, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 42, no. 4 (Autumn, 1988).

In Tunisia, in contrast, the immediate precipitant of Bourguiba's deposition and of Ben Ali's liberalization measures was not the Tunisian counterpart of Morocco's "bread riots," which also took place in January, 1984—they provoked a heightened struggle for power among Bourguiba's lieutenants. There was a prevailing concern that, without a change in government, the growing Islamist opposition would win control of the political arena by default. By 1987, Bourguiba's attention to politics and policy was flagging, while his Cabinet ministers preoccupied themselves with jockeying for position. As interior minister, former Brigadier General Ben Ali maintained a low profile, faithfully executing Bourguiba's unpopular commands to arrest Islamist militants. Soon after Ben Ali was appointed Prime Minister in October, 1987, however, Bourguiba's insistence on retrials and harsher sentences for several leading Islamists led some of their extremist supporters to plot a military coup; Ben Ali then decided that Bourguiba was on the verge of destroying the very institutions he himself had done so much to build. On November 7, 1987, Bourguiba was declared incompetent and, as his constitutionally designated successor, Ben Ali became President.⁹

The crisis that forced political change in Algeria was far bloodier: in the week of October 4, 1988, the country was rocked by its most violent social upheaval since independence in 1962. Widespread civilian riots in most of the major cities were brutally repressed by the army. The official death toll was 176 (other estimates put the number killed at over 500) and thousands of people were arrested. Within days, Bendjedid announced economic and political reforms, and the following month he reorganized the government.

LIBERALIZING RESPONSES

Obviously, all the governments of North Africa faced major difficulties; angry, recalcitrant populations threatened the very stability and longevity of the regimes themselves, not to mention their ability to formulate and implement policy. The liberal response to political crises brought about by the need for economic reform and austerity was unexpected; ordinarily, political and economic crises elicit authoritarian responses from the threatened governments. However, there were advantages for liberalization.

(Continued on page 174)

Lisa Anderson is the acting director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University. The author of *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), she is currently working on a book on political liberalization in the Arab world.

"Libya has embarked on a more moderate course both domestically and in its foreign relations. The changes, however, do not reflect a new spirit of reform because the fundamental principles on which the state is built have not changed significantly."

New Thinking in Libya

BY MARY-JANE DEEB

Associate Professor of Government, American University

THE socialist world faced rapid political and economic change in 1989 and witnessed the death of some of its leaders. The socialist nations of North Africa did not remain immune to the transformations occurring elsewhere but introduced change more slowly. Libya has chosen to retain its political structure and ideological frame of reference to permit only domestic economic reforms, which were undertaken in conjunction with a new course in foreign policy more in line with that of most Arab states.

Domestically, the changes represented an attempt by the Libyan leadership to remain in power by preempting an outpouring of popular resentment and forestalling the type of major upheaval that shook Algeria in October, 1988. Changes were also a result of the falling oil prices on the world market and the inability of the Libyan government to meet its payments on a number of development projects, imports of basic goods and arms purchases. Isolated regionally after the breakup of the Arab African Federation with Morocco in August, 1986, Libya's strongman Muammar Qaddafi had to find a way to rejoin the ranks of the Arab states. Support from the Arab world was essential to strengthen the Libyan leader's position at home. The price for reconciliation, however, involved significant changes in foreign policy, a price Qaddafi was willing to pay.

Internationally, the world was changing rapidly and Qaddafi was quick to understand the implications of those changes for Libya and to redirect its foreign policy accordingly. The inability or unwillingness of the Soviet Union to protect Libya from the United States raid of April, 1986, made it clear to the Libyan leadership that it could not rely on the Soviet Union for its national security. Diversifying and modernizing Libya's arsenal while pursuing better relations with the United States and with the West in general was the course Qaddafi chose.

This author has argued elsewhere that political imperatives have always been the determining factors behind the economic changes that have taken place in Libya since Qaddafi came to power.¹ It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the recent attempts to foster economic growth by encouraging the private sector to play a more active role in the economy are at least partly the result of political pressure.

A decade of radical socialist policies and deteriorating trade relations with the major Western powers, followed by a period of declining oil revenues, created major economic problems in Libya and serious dissatisfaction with the regime. The General People's Congress (the GPC) that has often been little more than a rubber stamp for government policies met for its twelfth annual meeting between February 25 and March 2, 1987, to discuss the state of the economy. It expressed popular grievances and demanded basic reforms including the direct sale of farm products to the consumer by farmers themselves, because state companies were inefficient in distributing food products; the diversification of investments; and the publication of consolidated bank accounts. The congress also demanded greater availability of medicines and spare parts and the regular payment of salaries.²

The significance of this meeting lies in the fact that the GPC, the defender of socialist ideals in the Libyan Jamahiriya ("a state run by the people without a government," according to Qaddafi), was criticizing state institutions and proposing changes. The proposals reveal the extent of popular frustration with the Libyan economic situation.

Islamic fundamentalist groups like al-Takfir wal-Hijra (Charge of Infidelity and Migration), al-Dawa wa al-Jihad (the Call and the Holy War), and the Tabligh (the Announcement) were attracting the discontented in urban centers, high schools and universities. In October, 1986, seven alleged members of the Hezbollah (the Party of God) had confessed on television to the murder of a member of a revolutionary committee who had tried to prevent them from trading privately in agricultural produce.³ The government had cracked down on

¹See Mary-Jane Deeb, "Libya's Economic Development 1961-1986: Social and Political Implications," *The Maghreb Review*, vol. 12, nos. 1-2 (January-April, 1987).

²*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (hereafter, *KCA*), vol. 33, no. 6 (June, 1987), p. 35220.

³*Ibid.*, p. 35219.

these groups, but it was difficult to erase their appeal to the disgruntled population.⁴

Libyans were also unhappy with the policy of forced conscription in an army that had suffered a humiliating defeat and a high number of casualties against Chadian forces in the early months of 1987. Opposition to the Libyan regime came from within the army as well as outside it. Defection of fighter plane and helicopter crews were frequent during early 1987, and in January of that year Colonel Husain Said al-Kadiki, the head of air defense operations, was shot at military headquarters after disagreeing over the use of Libyan forces to defend Iranian cities.⁵

Opposition to Qaddafi was becoming more organized outside Libya as well. In Cairo, in January, 1987, seven exiled Libyan opposition groups agreed to form a joint working group to continue exposing the Qaddafi regime's human rights violations and to pursue a course aimed at overthrowing the regime. These groups included the Libyan National Salvation Front, the Libyan National Struggle Movement, the Libyan National Democratic Front and the Libyan National Organization.

ECONOMIC CHANGE: A SAFETY VALVE

Qaddafi's response to these pressures was to undertake economic reforms while keeping the lid on the opposition. On March 26, 1987, he appeared on national television and discussed his new program. He first tackled the issue of agriculture, attributing the failure of that sector of the economy to manpower shortages in rural areas; he suggested that families employ outside help and share the profits from the land. Whereas hiring farmworkers remained illegal, Libyan farmers could now employ others on a profit-sharing basis that was aimed at reducing labor shortages in rural areas.⁶

The next two years saw very few changes in the agricultural sector. The basic reform was in the marketing of agricultural produce, which became the farmer's responsibility rather than the state's.⁷ Land ownership remained based on the principle of usufructuary: "Libyan soil is the property of all Lib-

yans; everyone has the right to use it to satisfy his own needs."

In his March, 1987, speech, Qaddafi was critical of Libya's industries and blamed state agencies for their inefficiency. His solution was to turn factories over to the workers and make them responsible for the production of goods and for every other aspect of the manufacturing process.⁸ In August, 1988, the General People's Secretariat for Industry announced the transfer of 73 large factories from the state to the workers.

The reforms in that sector, however, were less dramatic than they first appeared to be. Light industries were to be turned over to the private sector, while heavy industry was to remain in the hands of the state. The transfer could be made only to the workers actually employed in those factories. There was to be no entrepreneurial businessman engaged in the process of developing or expanding those industries. With all its qualifications, this transfer was not very different from Qaddafi's 1978 reforms, when he had urged workers to take factories and other enterprises from their owners, and become "partners, not wage laborers."⁹

Changes were perhaps more substantive in the third sector of the economy — trade. Qaddafi admitted in his March, 1987, speech, that state institutions had been slow and inefficient in distributing goods and commodities to the Libyan population. He even lauded the black market activities of those who tried to find a way to make up for the shortages in the domestic market. He suggested that the private sector should be allowed to distribute the goods, while the state should remain in control of foreign trade.¹⁰

In practice, that meant allowing the private sector to open stores to sell those goods, instead of distributing them to state cooperatives. Starting in mid-1988, Libyan, Tunisian and Western goods could be found in well-stocked stores in Tripoli and Benghazi and in smaller towns and villages. In contrast to an earlier era when merchants and tradesmen were described as parasites, the GPC was making statements to the effect that Libyans had the right to choose their own employment, including trading.

Libyans, however, had to prove that the shops were theirs and that they had not obtained their capital illegally. Not everyone was to be allowed to trade. "Let the elderly, the pensioners, physically handicapped and widows, and divorced women, those who are . . . on social security; let them engage in trade."¹¹ Those who had previously been businessmen or shopkeepers were forbidden to return to their original occupation.

Qaddafi's statements with regard to private property evoke a bureaucratic nightmare. In a speech on

⁴See Mary-Jane Deeb, "Libya," in Stuart Mews, ed., *Religion in Politics: A World Guide* (London: Longman, 1989).

⁵KCA, vol. 33, no. 6 (June, 1987), p. 35219.

⁶Tripoli Television Service, March 26, 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Near East Service* (hereafter, FBIS), March 27, 1987, p. Q3.

⁷Tripoli Television Service, January 16, 1989, in FBIS, January 17, 1989, p. 18.

⁸FBIS, March 27, 1987, p. Q3.

⁹See Marius K. Deeb and Mary-Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 115.

¹⁰FBIS, March 27, 1987, p. Q5.

¹¹Ibid.

January 9, 1989, he admitted that he had received many requests to return property confiscated by the state.¹² He argued that property would be returned only if it could be proved that it had originally been acquired without "exploiting" others. Furthermore, it had to be legalized through a newly created Department of Socialist Authentication that decided whether claims on land or property were legitimate. That department apparently did not recognize Ottoman or Italian notarization of property documents, nor would it accept the confirmation of witnesses. "No reasons, documents . . . will be sufficient to confirm or notarize a property for its legal owner."¹³ Qaddafi did not specify what requirements were needed to prove ownership; yet he threatened claimants with eviction from their homes if they did not find a way of proving their ownership and registering their property.

These new economic policies were intended to act as a safety valve, giving Libyans more freedom to trade and to acquire a greater variety of goods. The policies were not meant to change the system or to deviate too far from the path of Libyan socialism. Qaddafi was reluctant to allow the private sector greater economic freedom, fearing that, in the long run, it would lead to demands for more political freedom.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN POLITICS

Qaddafi appeared to be making changes in the political sphere as well; thus in March, 1988, he began freeing an estimated 400 political prisoners from Libyan jails. These included some of Qaddafi's own colleagues and coup participants, arrested in 1969—Lieutenant Colonel Musa Ahmad and Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Hawwaz. Qaddafi was shown on television bulldozing the walls of a prison and making statements to the effect that there were no more political prisoners in Libyan jails. The move was extremely popular and did much to diffuse simmering discontent. Qaddafi also invited the Libyan opposition in exile to return home, promising to return confiscated property, but very few responded.

In November, 1988, Qaddafi announced the restructuring of the military and the creation of a new voluntary paramilitary organization under a

separate command, to defend Libya's cities from external attacks.¹⁴ Two months later, he announced the elimination of certain state institutions including the agency responsible for sports because it was inefficient. Apparently so was the official news agency JANA, which he described as a "huge octopus with hundreds of officials" that did not deliver news on time.¹⁵

Qaddafi feared the army that had attempted to overthrow him several times; it had become even more threatening after its humiliating defeat in Chad in early 1987. Consequently, the restructuring of the traditional army was meant to purge some of its more dangerous elements; while the creation of still another voluntary paramilitary force was further to weaken the regular army and existing forces like the Jamahiri Guards and the People's Militias. On the other hand, the abolition of the Jamahiri sports agency and the Jamahiri news agency was probably part of the drastic program for reducing state expenditures. That program had been instituted in the second half of the 1980's when state revenues plummeted as a result of the fall in oil prices.¹⁶

There was no change, however, in the way Qaddafi dealt with political opposition. The Libyan authorities used repression and violence in their confrontation with the Islamic fundamentalists who had become the most vocal domestic opposition group. In February, 1987, nine men were hanged (and their execution was televised) for allegedly belonging to the Islamic Jihad Organization and having been involved in assassinations and acts of sabotage.¹⁷ In December, 1988, the authorities cracked down on students at the University of Tripoli, again in an attempt to quell protests and demonstrations purportedly organized by Islamic fundamentalists. During December, 1988, and January, 1989, armed members of the revolutionary committees raided mosques during prayers and arrested a number of worshipers suspected of being members of Islamic organizations critical of the regime.¹⁸

Qaddafi's policy remained unchanged on the creation of political parties or organizations independent of the state. "Any exploitation of religion will be nipped in the bud. Factionalism, sectarianism, partisanship and party membership are forbidden."¹⁹ Qaddafi also threatened with retribution those wishing to protest or demonstrate against his policies, saying that he would use tanks against demonstrators the way Joseph Stalin did in the Soviet Union.²⁰

Ideologically, there was no change. Algeria dropped the word "socialist" from its constitution, but Libya made no such change. In June, 1988, the GPC approved the passage of the "International

¹²Tripoli Television Service, January 9, 1989, in FBIS, January 11, 1989, p. 8.

¹³Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁴Tripoli Television Service, November 3, 1988, in FBIS, November 4, 1988, pp. 11-14.

¹⁵FBIS, January 17, 1989, p. 20.

¹⁶*Middle East Economic Digest*, March 19, 1988, p. 17.

¹⁷Tripoli Television Service, February 17, 1989, in FBIS, February 18, 1989, p. Q1.

¹⁸*Al-Inqadh*, vol. 7, no. 27 (March, 1989), pp. 8-9.

¹⁹FBIS, January 9, 1989, p. 17.

²⁰FBIS, October 7, 1989, p. 16.

Green Document for Peace and Human Rights in the Era of the Masses," which was designed as an alternative to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. It stated that power belonged to the people, that men and women were equal, that exploitation of others was illegal, that land belonged to all and that houses belonged to those who lived in them; it also guaranteed the right to a fair trial. The document condemned terrorism and called for the abolition of chemical and nuclear weapons.²¹ In essence, it was a reformulation of the principles expressed a decade earlier in *The Green Book*.

REGIONAL POLITICS

After the breakup of the Arab African Federation with Morocco in August, 1986, Libya found itself isolated in the region. Qaddafi immediately tried to create unions or alliances with neighboring states. After two failed attempts at uniting with Sudan and with Algeria, Libya was invited to join the Arab Maghrebi Union with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania in February, 1989.²²

The inclusion of Libya in the union was strategically important for the other states of the Maghreb because Libya constituted a natural buffer between Egypt—which was becoming once again a dominant player in Arab affairs—and the rest of North Africa. The union also enhanced Qaddafi's position domestically and brought him out of isolation regionally, thus increasing his influence and giving him a longer lease on power.

The union was meant to be primarily an economic integration of the North African states, loosely based on the European Community model. Consequently, even before the official creation of the union, many bilateral and multilateral economic agreements were signed between the states in the region. Libya and Tunisia, whose relations had improved dramatically after the demise of President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia in November, 1987, reached a number of agreements on agricultural, industrial and infrastructural projects.²³ Tens of thousands of Tunisian workers were allowed to return to work in Libya, after having been expelled in 1985. Libyans were also permitted to travel freely to Tunisia, and it was reported that an estimated one million had done so since early 1988. Algeria

²¹KCA, vol. 35, no. 3 (March, 1989), pp. 36570-36571.

²²For a discussion of the political and economic implications of the union, see Mary-Jane Deeb, "The Arab Maghribi Union in the Context of Regional and International Politics," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 6, no. 5 (Spring, 1989), pp. 42-46; and Mary-Jane Deeb, "A New Era in the Maghreb?" *The World and I*, vol. 4, no. 7 (July, 1989), pp. 107-112.

²³See text of joint communiqué between Libya and Tunisia, in FBIS, April 7, 1988, pp. 9-12.

²⁴See text of joint statement issued by Algeria and Libya on June 29, 1988, in FBIS, June 30, 1988, pp. 10-11.

²⁵See text of Union Treaty, in FBIS, February 21, 1989, p. 7.

and Libya opened their borders to the free movement of people between their countries and removed trade barriers on their goods. They also set up a joint bank, the Arab Maghreb Bank for Investment and Trade, a petrochemical company and eight other joint companies.²⁴ Moroccan-Libyan relations also improved when borders were opened with all states of the union; however, trade remained rather limited, as Morocco focused more on its relations with Algeria than on relations with states further east.

Politically, there are many implications for Libya. The treaty's provisions include the stipulation that no state may enter a coalition that could threaten the security or territorial integrity of the other members of the union.²⁵ That limits Libya's ability to set up unions or alliances with any state it chooses; it may have to seek the approval of other member states before embarking on such projects.

Another treaty provision stipulates that members of the union may not allow any activity on their territory that threatens the security of the other members. Libya may no longer initiate attacks on its neighbors (as it did in Jarba, in 1980, against Tunisia), nor may it support groups opposing any of the Maghrebi regimes, nor undertake terrorist activities against its neighbors. The other side of the coin is that none of the Maghrebi states may legitimately offer a safe haven to the Libyan opposition in exile.

The policy to allow the free movement of people and goods among Maghrebi states also weakens the Libyan state's control over its citizens. It gives them more freedom to move and to seek employment elsewhere, and to buy goods and property abroad. But more significantly, it allows for the freer movement of ideas, books, magazines and newspapers. In a region in which Islamic fundamentalism is rapidly becoming the major mobilizing force against existing regimes, this may be a dangerous development for Qaddafi.

THE EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN RAPPROCHEMENT

On October 16, 1989, after long months of negotiations, Qaddafi met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Marsa Matruh on the Mediterranean coast of Egypt, on Qaddafi's first visit to that country in 16 years. The next day, Mubarak and a high-ranking delegation flew to Tobruk on the Libyan coast to continue the talks. Both heads of state

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Mary-Jane Deeb coauthored (with Marius K. Deeb) *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982). She is also the author of *Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

"The situation in Sudan is one of multiple, interacting crises. The heritage of ineffective rule, both civilian and military, is frightening. The issue may in fact have changed from who will rule Sudan to whether or not Sudan will be able to survive in any meaningful fashion."

Political Crisis in Sudan

By JOHN O. VOLL

Professor of History, University of New Hampshire

A group of military officers took control of the Sudanese government on June 30, 1989. They announced that the Sudanese Armed Forces "have put an end to the chaos prevailing in the country" and dissolved all political institutions.¹ This is the fourth time since Sudanese independence in 1956 that a group of officers have brought an end to the existing political system and proclaimed the beginning of a new era. In this alternation of civilian and military governments there are continuing patterns that make the events sound remarkably similar. However, in the long run, the situation in Sudan has deteriorated significantly. The country is now in the midst of a grave crisis reflected and intensified by the military coup.

The creation and overthrow of a civilian parliamentary regime that had lasted from early 1986 until the summer of 1989 followed the pattern of previous experiences in Sudan. The first era of parliamentary politics began in 1953. At that time Sudan was moving toward independence from control by the British, who had ruled Sudan in conjunction with Egypt since the end of the nineteenth century. The first elections, in 1953, created a Parliament that proclaimed Sudanese independence at the beginning of 1956. However, civilian politicians appeared unable to resolve the problems of the economy and a civil war in the southern part of the country. Late in 1958, high-ranking military officers led by General Ibrahim Abboud announced that the army had found it necessary to save the country from the chaos created by the civilian politicians; the major political institutions were then dissolved.²

The first period of military rule lasted from 1958 until 1964. At first, General Abboud seemed to bring needed stability to Sudan. However, he

became increasingly dictatorial as his policies led to increased economic difficulties and growing fighting in southern Sudan. In 1964, mass demonstrations led to the fall of the Abboud regime and the restoration of a civilian parliamentary system. The restored politicians provided a sense of popular participation in politics but were no more effective than they had been in the 1950's in finding solutions to the problems of the economy and bringing an end to the civil war. As a result, another group of soldiers promised to end the chaos created by the politicians and took over the government in May, 1969.

The new military regime was led by Gaafar Nimeiry, who remained in power until 1985. At various times during the second era of military rule, the old patterns seemed to have been broken. In 1972, Nimeiry was able to bring a negotiated end to the civil war by recognizing special autonomy for the south. In the mid-1970's, there was much discussion that Sudan might become the "breadbasket of the Arab world," and large amounts of capital began to flow into economic development. Nimeiry also initiated a policy of decentralization that aimed at encouraging popular participation in government at the local and regional levels. At the beginning of the 1980's, some optimism was possible, but the situation changed rapidly.³

Nimeiry attempted to impose his own reorganization on the southern region, reigniting civil war in the south. Civil war intensified in 1983, when Nimeiry began a program of immediate and literalist Islamization with the "September Laws." Active opposition was organized in the south by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang. The SPLM was primarily a southern movement, but it was joined by some northerners. By 1985, the SPLM was in control of (or at least contesting government control of) significant portions of southern Sudan.

Active opposition to Nimeiry also grew in the north, where corruption and government mismanagement, as well as the growing costs of the civil war, created a major economic crisis. In addition, most Muslim leaders in the north opposed the September Laws, and by March, 1985, Nimeiry

¹Statements and proclamations reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Near East and South Asia Daily Report* (cited as FBIS), June 30, 1989.

²P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, 4th edition (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 171-172.

³Presentations of the early optimistic view and a subsequent pessimistic view can be found in John O. Voll, "Reconciliation in the Sudan," *Current History*, December, 1981, and Scott H. Jacobs, "The Sudan's Islamization," *Current History*, May, 1985.

had even suppressed the Islamic revivalist Muslim Brotherhood, which had initially supported his program. Mass civilian demonstrations undermined the military regime, as they had in 1964. Military autocracy and the inability to resolve the basic issues of national unity and the economy opened the way for another restoration of parliamentary rule.

The transition to parliamentary rule was handled by a Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by General Abdul Rahman Siwar Dhahab. The TMC was a group of high-ranking officers that overthrew Nimeiry in April, 1985, and promised elections and the restoration of civilian rule in a year. The pledge was kept, and elections in the spring of 1986 returned the old political parties to control of Sudan. The SPLM did not participate in the transition, charging that the new government was only continuing Nimeiry's policies in a new format. Although there were negotiations, the civil war continued.

The restored parliamentary government was more a repetition of the pattern of the 1960's than a continuation of Nimeiry's regime. The major parties, and even many of the leaders, were those who had been active in the earlier era. The Prime Minister was Sadiq Mahdi, who had been Prime Minister in 1966-1967. Unfortunately, the new government continued the ineffectiveness of the old and was unable to improve the economic conditions of the country significantly. The government was formed by a continually shifting coalition of parties that provided little political stability. Although some negotiations had taken place with the SPLM, the civil war continued. In this context, a group of officers again declared that Sudan had to be saved from the politicians, and on June 30, 1989, Sudan returned to military rule.

Sudan has experienced two broadly different styles of government since independence. Civilian and military regimes have alternated but neither appears to have been able to resolve the fundamental problems of political stability and economic development. Each style has had special characteristics, strengths and weaknesses.

Civilian political organizations reflect society to a remarkable degree. Because Sudanese society contains major elements of social and religious diversity, political groups represent that diversity. This could be a strength for civilian politics if the political leaders could establish common interests that would provide stability while recognizing diversity. Instead, most of the time, parliamentary politics has provided the arena for competition, leading to a high level of instability. Civilian leaders have tended to concentrate their attention on gaining positions for themselves and their groups rather than focusing on national issues.

The major Sudanese political organizations are

firmly based on older social and religious groups. The largest single party has been the Ummah party, currently led by Sadiq Mahdi. The primary mass support for this party comes from the Ansar or Mahdists, whose movement began in the late nineteenth century when Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah, a Muslim teacher, proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi, or leader, sent by God to establish justice and God's will on earth. Sadiq Mahdi is the great grandson of Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah, and his father and grandfather were the Ansar leaders who created and led the Ummah party when it was organized in the early days of party politics after World War II.

The Ummah party's mass support is not directly related to the performance of the party; it depends on the prior loyalty of many Sudanese to the Mahdist movement. As a result, despite popular willingness to accept the dissolution of the parties when the military took control, restoration of civilian politics has always resulted in the recreation of a Mahdist political party led by members of the Mahdi family and other prominent Ansar. Although social change and political turmoil have had some impact on its support, the Ummah party received about 44 percent of the popular vote in the northern provinces in the 1953 elections and about 40 percent in the 1986 elections. Under the current military government, even though many Mahdists are disappointed with Sadiq Mahdi and civilian politicians in general, they would probably continue to give their votes to Ummah party candidates should they have the opportunity.

The Democratic Unionist party (DUP), the second major party, has a similar tie to a religious organization, but its tradition is more complex. The Khatmiyyah Order, a Muslim organization led by the Mirghani family, had roots in popular Muslim devotional revivalism in the early nineteenth century. It has never been so directly political as its rival, the Mahdist movement, but when party politics began after World War II, the Mirghanis gave their support to a nationalist party that advocated unity with Egypt. The National Unionist party (NUP), renamed the Democratic Unionist party in 1969, combined secular nationalists with the Khatmiyyah followers, and the two wings were often in competition. The DUP was more clearly controlled by the Mirghani family in the 1980's, but its popular base of support has declined as the non-Khatmiyyah people tended to move to new political groups. As a result, the overall vote in northern provinces for the NUP/DUP declined from about 44 percent in the 1953 elections to about 30 percent in 1986. This still makes it the second largest party in Sudan and, despite frequent predictions of the end of Mirghani influence in Sudanese politics, the

DUP will probably continue to win significant votes whenever northern Sudanese have the opportunity to vote. Despite disappointment with the political record of the DUP, Khatmiyyah loyalties remain an important political factor in northern Sudanese politics.

The Ummah and the DUP are northern Sudanese political parties that have dominated civilian politics because of the domination of politics in general by northern groups and leaders who are basically Arabic-speaking Muslims. In the southern third of the country, however, the overwhelming majority are neither Arab nor Muslim. Southern political groups have been based on the educated elite and have not been directly identified with major southern ethnic or religious groups, although sometimes ethnic groups like the Dinka have dominated the leadership of particular organizations.

As a result, southern parties have been small and numerous, and have had difficulty in uniting. In the context of the civil war, military command groups have been more effective than political parties in providing unity. In the late 1960's, the gradual unification of armed opposition in the south under the leadership of Joseph Lagu made possible the negotiated settlement of 1972. In the 1980's, there have been many southern political parties, but again the most effective unity has been provided by the SPLM, the political organization associated with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

The SPLM led by John Garang is the strongest organization speaking for the formal recognition of the religious and ethnic diversity of the peoples of Sudan. In contrast to earlier groups, it is not simply a southern resistance movement, although it is the vehicle for the most effective southern protests against the policies of the central government. Officially, the SPLM calls for the establishment of a secular democratic state and the end of what it sees as Arab and Muslim hegemony. Garang emphasizes that the SPLM

is committed to the liberation of the whole Sudan and to the unity of the people . . . [and] is committed to a radical restructuring of the power of the central government in a manner that will once and for all end the monopoly of power by a few in Khartoum.⁴

It is unclear what support the SPLM would attract outside the south in national elections, although Garang believes that non-Arabs in the north are potential supporters of the SPLM. At present, the SPLM controls many areas in the south and is an essential participant in any arrangements that would end the civil war. However, in the politics of

a peaceful and autonomous southern region after the 1972 agreement, Lagu and his organization were not able to provide the unity in peacetime politics that they had created in the context of war, and Garang might have similar difficulties.

The older radical political organization in Sudan is the Sudanese Communist party (SCP), which was formally organized in the years after World War II. It built important ties to the developing trade union movement and had significant support among educated Sudanese. During the 1960's, the SCP was possibly the largest Communist party in Africa, although it never became a mass party. Communists played an important role in the early years of the Nimeiry regime, but the party was harshly suppressed after a group of leftist officers with Communist connections attempted to overthrow Nimeiry in the summer of 1971. The SCP joined the other civilian parties in opposition and was then active in the parliamentary politics of the 1980's. After the 1960's, the SCP never emerged as a significant threat to the established parties or military regimes.

The Muslim Brotherhood has become a major new force in Sudanese politics. Like the SCP, the Brotherhood emerged as a political grouping of educated Sudanese in the years after World War II. Brothers advocated a program of strict adherence to Islam and the implementation of Islamic law (sharia) in Sudan. They believed that they could achieve this goal by converting individuals rather than by demanding that the government impose Islamic regulations. They vigorously opposed anything that seemed to threaten Islam in Sudan, but they also opposed the older Islamic organizations, regarding them as sectarian movements that had abandoned what the Brotherhood thought of as the true teachings of Islam.

A major new element in the civilian politics of the 1980's was the emergence of the Brotherhood and activist Islamic politics. During the 1970's, there had been some resurgence of Islam in general. Many Muslims were paying greater attention to requirements like prayers and fasting. Even though many opposed the specifics of the Nimeiry program in 1983, the Islamization program reflected the growing importance of a more literal adherence to Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood benefited from this changing mood and, through its activities, strengthened it. The Brotherhood was able to spread its influence beyond student and younger professional groups. In the elections of the 1950's and 1960's, parties supported by the Brotherhood received few votes, reaching a peak of about 5 percent of the total vote in the northern provinces in the 1965 elections. However, in 1986, the National Islamic Front (NIF), the Brotherhood-supported par-

⁴John Garang *Speaks*, edited by Mansour Khalid (London: Kegan Paul International, 1987), pp. 125-126.

ty, received almost 20 percent of the vote in northern Sudan.

The basic problem during times of civilian parliamentary rule was that the major parties represented sectarian interests rather than political programs. Other parties were forced to compete against deep personal, social and religious loyalties. Until the 1980's, the groups that advocated the elimination of sectarian politics could be seen as secularist and anti-Islamic. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a political force provided a "nonsectarian" but Islamic alternative with growing influence. The traditional parties could not be defeated in elections, which meant that when civilian politics failed, the only recourse was a revolutionary transformation of the government. In Sudan, the only institution capable of this was the military, so the military became the alternative when sectarian civilian politics failed.

MILITARY RULE

Military rule has important roots in Sudan. The modern Sudanese state was created during the first half of the twentieth century under the conditions of military rule. The British administration in Sudan was significantly military in nature, especially in its early days. After the British conquest in 1898, the provincial and central government administrators were usually British officers. Military-style discipline was an important part of the spirit of administration. As a result, despite the formal British advocacy of a parliamentary type of government for Sudan when it became independent, the government structures inherited by Sudanese civilian leaders had a military tone, with an emphasis on a hierarchical command structure and central control. This made it more difficult for the central government to respond with flexibility to the challenges created by parliamentary politics.

Military regimes in Sudan have tended to alternate between a technocratic managerial approach and a ideologically committed approach. Ibrahim Abboud was not innovative in ideological terms. He attempted to bring stability and order to Sudan through effective management and did not make a major effort to create a mass political organization. Instead, he worked through a hierarchical command structure. When his programs did not bring an end to the economic problems or the civil war, his management of the country was discredited and he was forced from power.

Nimeiry, on the other hand, was committed to a relatively radical program defined in terms of Arab

socialism. Through the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), he attempted to create a new style of political organization that would replace the traditional sectarian parties, and he hoped that the new ideology would provide the basis for a national identity. Although he won the support of most Sudanese in his efforts to bring the civil war to an end and to build a sound economy, he never succeeded in persuading the Sudanese to transfer their basic loyalties from existing institutions and groups.

The third military regime was the short-lived transition government in 1985-1986. Here the goals were clear and the military was purely managerial, operating the government machinery until elected civilians could assume control. In this sense, the brief government of Siwar Dhahab was the most successful military regime in Sudan.

As a manager with specific goals, the military has had some success. Abboud brought some stability, for a short time, to Sudan and Nimeiry created the bases for a national reconciliation that brought a temporary end to the civil war and brought some civilian politicians back to Sudan in the late 1970's. However, in the long run, the authoritarian tendencies of the Sudanese military leaders led them to rule inflexibly and thus to make problems worse. Abboud attempted to bring an end to the civil war by military victory and only escalated the conflict, while Nimeiry's attempts to impose an ideology on the country increased opposition to him. Neither Abboud nor Nimeiry understood that the fundamental economic problems of Sudan could not be resolved by military management.

The military government established in the summer of 1989 by Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir tried to identify itself with the virtues of military rule. The goal of the revolution was to bring an end to the chaos of the politicians and the corruption of sectarian politics. Although Bashir adopted a managerial tone in many of his early proclamations, there are important indications that the regime has an ideological identification with the NIF or the Muslim Brotherhood. The SPLM uses this as part of its strong criticism of the Bashir regime;⁵ other observers see this commitment as a potential weakness.⁶

Such an ideological commitment means that active mass support may be difficult to mobilize; the success of Bashir's regime depends on its ability to

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⁵FBIS, 89-191, October 4, 1989, gives a typical statement of the SPLM position.

⁶Ann M. Lesch, "Khartoum Diary," *Middle East Report*, no. 161 (November-December, 1989), p. 37.

"President Hissène Habré of Chad depends on his own clients and on his ability to satisfy other powerful patrons to guarantee his political survival. Yet to win the peace, he will have to escape their embrace and build on the formal political structures he has created."

Turmoil in Chad

BY GEORGE JOFFE

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FOR the first time since the Chadian civil war began in 1965, Chad's population turned out to vote on December 10, 1989.¹ The nationwide election had been called to approve a new constitution and to elect Hissène Habré, the charismatic victor in the civil war, as President. The election was also designed to ensure that Chad's government could claim national legitimacy and a popular mandate for its proposed economic and political reconstruction of the country.² After over two decades of warfare that, on occasion, involved neighboring countries, European states and even the United States, the Chadian economy has been shattered and its complex and diverse society is still riven with discord and antagonism.³ It is precisely these tensions, added to anxiety over the intentions of Libya, Chad's northern neighbor, that have cast doubt on the future of the national recon-

ciliation that the Habré regime is now seeking.

The official announcement on December 11 that, according to early returns, the new constitution had been approved by a large majority of the 2.5 million voters was confirmed some days later when the final result was announced. Hissène Habré was elected for a seven-year term that, under the new constitution, he can extend for three more terms, thus allowing him to retain supreme power until the year 2018. The new constitution itself was approved by a suspiciously high 99.08 percent of the electorate.

The net result is that the regime that Hissène Habré created by force of arms in the wake of his victory over the forces of the *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition* (GUNT) in the second half of 1982 now rests de jure on a firm constitutional base.⁴ It is buttressed by a single political party, the *Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Révolution* (UNIR), which was created in late 1984, and guaranteed by the 35,000-strong *Forces Armées Nationales du Tchad* (FANT).⁵ Both institutions form an integral part of the administration; aside from difficulties in the Guera prefecture and along the northern Sudanese-Chadian border region, the administration is now effective throughout the country, particularly in the south.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The new government certainly needs cohesion and popular support because it faces massive economic problems. Purchasing power has been eroded by 40 percent in the past decade, with average income in 1985 estimated at U.S.\$105 per capita. The war has absorbed up to 40 percent of all budgetary expenditure and there has also been a special war levy of around CFAFr2 billion (CFAFr, francs de la Coopération Financière en Afrique) annually levied mainly on civil servants, which continues in effect although there has been little military action during the past year.

The war has also drained essential goods from the civilian sector and diverted trained personnel from the administration into the armed forces. The government has not been able to concentrate on

¹The civil war is conventionally dated to have broken out with a tax rebellion among Moubi transhumants in Mangalmé in October, 1965. It became generalized after 1965, once French military administrators withdrew from the Borku-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region and were replaced by southern Sara administrative personnel. It was at this point, coincidentally, that the opposition to the southern-dominated Tombalbaye regime in N'Djamena was united under the FROLINAT (*Front de Libération Nationale*) banner and it was from FROLINAT that the Habré regime was eventually to emerge. See E.G.H. Joffe, "Libya and Chad," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 21 (May-September, 1981), pp. 81-102; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Conflict in Chad* (London: Hurst & Company, 1981), pp. 131-133; Robert Buijtenhuijs, *Le Frolinat et les révoltes populaires au Tchad 1965-1976* (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1978), p. 323.

²*Le Monde*, December 9-10, 1989.

³According to *Le Monde* (December 27, 1989), 45 political prisoners were released on the occasion of Habré's swearing-in ceremony. Nonetheless, dissent is still rife.

⁴The FAN (*Forces Armées du Nord*) conquered the capital, N'Djamena, on June 6, 1982, but fighting continued in the Sara heartland of southern Chad until the United Nations announced, on September 9, 1982, that peace reigned throughout Chad for the first time in 17 years. See E.G.H. Joffe, "The International Consequences of the Civil War in Chad," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 25 (September-December, 1982), pp. 100-101.

⁵Kaye Whiteman, *Chad* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1988), p. 14.

economic reconstruction, and existing structures have begun to disintegrate. This has seriously affected water distribution systems, urban public sector services, the infrastructure, agriculture and agro-based industry in southern Chad.

The war damage to major urban centers has been considerable, especially in N'Djamena, which was the focus for the outbreak of the second stage of the civil war between the GUNT and Habré's FAN (Forces Armées du Nord) in 1980, and in Abéché, where Habré's final offensive against the GUNT began in November, 1981. The consequent problems have been worsened by rural-urban migration over the past decade; the population of N'Djamena, for example, increased tenfold, to 600,000.

The road system—there are only 250 kilometers of paved roads throughout the country, which is over 1 million square kilometers in area—has been severely damaged, particularly the roads between the capital, N'Djamena, the strategic eastern city of Abéché and the southern center of Sarh. The damage to the road system has had a startling effect on consumer prices. Millet, for example, which is produced mainly in southern Chad, was in surplus in 1986 and was sold there for CFAFr12 per kilogram. By the time it had been transported to N'Djamena, however, the price had increased fivefold and at Abéché it had increased tenfold—simply because of the transport costs involved.

Similar problems exist in other sectors of the economy. Although Chad has the potential to satisfy its food requirements, in 1988 locusts and drought reduced harvests significantly. The all-important livestock trade in eastern Chad has also been affected by unsettled conditions in Sudan. The vital cotton industry in southern Chad—the major economic legacy of the colonial period and the prime component of the country's exports—has collapsed, partly because of intrinsic management problems and partly because cotton prices have declined in recent years. Similar problems face the state-controlled sugar industry, while petroleum supplies for Nigeria suffer from very high transport costs. The electricity supply to major urban centers also needs a complete overhaul.

Chad's economic relations with the outside world offer little additional encouragement. Cotton exports (mainly to West Germany), which have been depressed in recent years, make up half the export total. Imports, one-third of which come from France, regularly outstrip exports, and the trade deficit usually exceeds the value of exports. Not sur-

prisingly, the current account is habitually in deficit, to the tune of SDR69.9 million (SDR, Special Drawing Rights) in 1987, and not even the Chadian government expects it to move into surplus until 1992.

As a result, Chad's foreign debt in 1986 reached \$171.8 million—trivial when compared with debtors like Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, but crippling in a country trying to recover from a debilitating civil war. This is particularly significant since Chad's debt servicing in 1990 and 1994 is expected to rise to \$8 million and \$10.6 million respectively. It is, in effect, equivalent to between 10 and 15 percent of the current account deficit, and an undesirable burden on Chad's export earning power.

There has been a reconstruction program in operation since the mid-1980's, despite continuing warfare in the north. However, only after Libyan-backed forces were forced out of the country in the first five months of 1987 was a determined effort made to revive the economy. This involved considerable amounts of foreign aid. Between 1987 and 1989, the Chadian government anticipated aid worth \$950 million, of which grants were expected to total \$650 million.

The most immediate aid was expected from multilateral donors. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided a three-year structural adjustment facility worth SDR19.4 million in October, 1987, and, in January, 1988, the World Bank offered \$42 million, most of which was destined to restructure the cotton sector. Further soft loans for specific projects were expected from the International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan affiliate of the World Bank. The European Community (EC) provided aid for road and urban reconstruction. Bilateral aid was also expected from France and the United States for budgetary support, and project aid was sought from other European countries.

The problems are still massive. Nonetheless, individual initiative has done a great deal to ease the economic difficulties Chad continues to face, particularly in the field of consumer supply. Much retail trade is now transacted in the informal sector of the economy. The size of this sector is unknown, but estimates have ranged from 20 to 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Goods are smuggled in from Cameroon and Nigeria. Sugar and petroleum products have dominated the trade. Sugar comes from the Central African Republic, Gabon and Cameroon, while petroleum products come from Nigeria, where the trade is stimulated by the very high prices paid to Nigerians by Chadian consumers.⁶

The Habré government will have to find some way to bring this trade back into the formal sector of the economy, because it denies the state essential

⁶See the articles on Chad in *Africa Contemporary Record 1987-1988* and *Africa Contemporary Record 1988-1989* for further details.

fiscal revenue and undermines productive activity in the formal economy. Smuggled sugar has done a great deal to destroy the viability of Chad's own sugar industry, for example. However, the economic problems are being actively tackled and can eventually be solved. Chad's political problems are far more serious for the future of the Habré regime.

THE POLITICAL SCENE

Although President Habré claims that national reconciliation has been accomplished by the recent referendum and that Chad's political problems are the result of Libyan interference and aggression, the political situation is far more complicated and far less reassuring than the President suggests. In large measure, this is because the new Chadian government is a prisoner of its own history. The tensions and opposition it has faced and will face reflect the forces that brought it into existence; these forces in turn stem from the origins of the civil war and the procedures by which Chad obtained independence in 1960.

Chad's colonial experience under French rule between 1913 and 1960, which created a new political entity, did little to prepare it for existence as an independent state.⁷ Although the Sara heartland in the Logone region in the south, described by the French administration as "Tchad utile," was forced into cotton cultivation for a French monopoly purchaser, COTONFRAN (eventually to become COTONTCHAD), most of the rest of the country ("Tchad inutile") was subjected to military control and was left in isolation. This was particularly true of the vast BET (Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti) region inhabited by the transhumant Tibu tribal confederation that had previously been exposed to the influence of the Sanusi order.

The major clans of the Teda faction of the Tibu were concentrated around the Saharan massif of Tibesti and traditionally transhumed northward toward the Libyan desert center of Murzuk. The other major faction, the Daza (also known as the Gorane) spread eastward toward the Fada and Faya. Hissène Habré comes from a fringe clan of the Daza, the Anakaza around Fada. The Libyan-based Sanusi religious movement had moved southward during the final decade of the nineteenth century and had been at the forefront of resistance to French occupation. It had also been responsible for the revival of Islam among the Tibu, who had previously been very nominal Muslims.

⁷The colonial and pre-colonial periods in Chad are well covered in Christien Bouquet, *Tchad, genèse du conflit* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1982); and Bernard Lanne, *Tchad-Libye, la querelle des frontières* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982).

⁸Virginia Thomas and Richard Adloff, *Conflict in Chad* (London: Hurst & Company, 1981), p. 129.

The central Muslim sultanates of Kanem-Bornu, Baguirmi and Ouaddai depended in part on the trans-Saharan trade that was controlled in transit by the northern tribal confederations, including the Tibu. A large proportion of the trade originally involved slaves from regions to the south, including the Sara heartland of Logone. The balance of their economic life was dependent on transhumant pastoralism, as it is today. The populations, half of whom were Arab-speaking and who were often replicates of tribal groups in Libya, comprised around half the total population of the area covered by modern Chad, while the northern Saharan fringe region inhabited by the Tibu contained less than 10 percent of the total. The balance was squeezed into the Logone region, covered by the modern prefectures of Mayo-Kebbi, Logone Orientale, Logone Occidentale, Moyen-Chari and Tandjile.

One of the most important consequences of the concentration of French commercial interests in southern Chad during the colonial period was to ensure that independent Chad acquired an administration that, under President François Tombalbaye, was dominated by the Sara. Conversely, the northern Tibu who remained under French military administration at the request of the newly independent government until 1965, were politically marginalized. The populations of the central sultanates, which dominated in the pre-colonial political dispensation, now found themselves under increasingly repressive Sara control.

Apart from manifest maladministration, the situation of these central Chadian populations was made more intolerable by their memories of the pre-colonial situation. It was worsened by the fact that, as Muslims, they were controlled by ethnic groups they perceived to be animists and Christians. Furthermore, under President Charles de Gaulle, France clearly had a special concern for Chad because of the support expressed for de Gaulle by Governor Félix Eboué during World War II and because of the role played by Sara recruits to Gaullist forces.⁸

One result of this was French readiness to intervene on behalf of the Tombalbaye government as the civil war intensified after 1966. First, an organized resistance movement (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad, FROLINAT) developed and, second, the movement began to be dominated by northern Tibu elements. FROLINAT was formed in June, 1966, by Ibrahim Abatcha, a Nigerian who had gone into exile in Egypt and Sudan in 1963 because of militant trade union activity. He had united his Union Nationale Tchadienne with more conservative Muslim groups to form FROLINAT. Despite an early split—a tendency that was to become endemic in

FROLINAT—Abatcha, together with seven colleagues who had been educated in Arab universities and then trained in North Korea, formed an effective guerrilla movement that successfully overcame the ethnic, linguistic and confessional divides that had bedeviled Chadian political life.

Although Abatcha was killed in action in 1968, the civil war continued to spread into central Chad.⁹ At the same time, elements of FROLINAT began to exploit the increasing disaffection in the BET region, where the Derde, the traditional leader of the Teda, had fled to Libya to avoid the depredations of the Sara-appointed administrators in Tibesti. His son, Goukouni Oueddai, soon joined one of the elements of FROLINAT. By 1969, the French authorities were so concerned by the situation facing the Tombalbaye government that they responded to a Chadian request to intervene, and a task force of 900 French soldiers soon provided sufficient support to Chad's own armed forces to bottle up FROLINAT in the northern BET region.

The net result of this development, however, was effectively to transform FROLINAT into a Tibu-dominated force. Abatcha's original conception of a nationalist and anti-imperialist struggle was now replaced by an ethnic confrontation. The Tibu (with support from the Muslim Arab-speaking populations of central Chad) were to confront the Sara, with their foothold in government and French support. Goukouni Oueddai soon emerged as the leading field commander, in charge of the Second Liberation Army, more usually known as the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), while the formal leadership of FROLINAT had devolved on Abba Siddik, a former government minister from central Chad. Oueddai provided the movement with a strongly pro-Libyan cast, given the traditional Teda links with Libya.

Oueddai soon found himself sharing command with a new recruit to FROLINAT, Hissène Habré, a French-trained lawyer from Fada and a Tibu (Daza) who claimed to have become a Maoist while in Paris and who had originally worked for the Tombalbaye administration until he defected at the end of 1971. By 1972, Habré had become a dominant personality inside the FAN and Goukouni Oueddai ceded command to him, becoming his deputy. Within four years, however, a split developed between the two Tibu leaders.

The cause was a disagreement over the policy to

be adopted toward Libyan claims on the Aozou Strip region of northern Chad. Libya, under both the Qaddafi regime and its monarchist predecessor, argued that a 1935 treaty between France and Fascist Italy granted the 800-kilometer-long and 100-kilometer-wide strip along the Chadian-Libyan border to Libya—a claim that was not recognized in international law.¹⁰ Libya, however, had unilaterally occupied the region at the end of 1972—a move that Oueddai was prepared to tolerate but that Habré was not.

The issue was complicated by a disagreement over FROLINAT's response to a 1975 coup in N'Djamena that had removed Tombalbaye from power, replacing him with Félix Malloum, another Sara leader with a military background. France had also intervened, once again, in support of the new Sara administration. Oueddai was prepared to reach some accommodation with the new regime, but Habré was not. Eventually the FAN split, with 700 Habré loyalists abandoning Oueddai's supporters, who renamed themselves the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP).¹¹ Ironically, they eventually joined the Malloum government.

Despite a Nigerian-brokered attempt to enforce a negotiated solution to the civil war as the Malloum administration collapsed in 1979, the hostility between the two Tibu leaders dominated internal events inside Chad. Both leaders were forced to participate, along with the leaders of ten other factions of FROLINAT, in the GUNT set up by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) under the 1979 Lagos Accords. Goukouni Oueddai was designated the GUNT President and Hissène Habré was its defense minister.

The GUNT was supposed to prepare for elections 18 months later but by March, 1980, the two Tibu groups were openly fighting each other. The FAN had also alienated southern factions by a massacre perpetrated against Sara residents in N'Djamena at the end of the previous year. It was clear that the Chadian situation had degenerated into an ethnic confrontation, in which ideology no longer played a role. Habré himself had acquired a reputation for being a clever, ruthless opportunist, concerned only with achieving supreme political power.

(Continued on page 175)

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⁹E.G.H. Joffe, "Libya and Chad" *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 21 (May-September, 1981), p. 93.

¹⁰See Bernard Lanne, *Tchad-Libye: la querelle des frontières*, (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982), p. 184ff.

¹¹Personal communication; Mahamat Said, Conseil Militaire du GUNT (August, 1980).

"It is clear. . . that the Algeria of the 1990's will be subject to further strains — emanating from the post-independence generation, the difficult economic conjuncture and the competing visions of society that jostle one another in this Mediterranean Arab state."

Algeria after the Explosion

By ROBERT A. MORTIMER

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SMOLDERING discontent erupted in Algeria in October, 1988. The rioters, mostly young men and boys, swept through the streets trashing government offices, cars and shops—anything that represented elite power or privilege. The unrest exposed serious rifts in the country, between state and civil society on the one hand and between the generations on the other. The regime cracked down harshly, declaring an unprecedented "state of siege," and restored order after three or four frenzied days. Then began the government's much longer and more difficult task of social and political reconstruction.

Since his speech of October 10, 1988, promising reforms, President Chadli Bendjedid has been cautiously picking his way through a minefield of social forces seeking to avert a further explosion. Suddenly Bendjedid has found himself challenged to institute political reform after years of tinkering with economic reforms. He rewrote the constitution to permit political pluralism after 26 years of National Liberation Front (FLN) single-party rule. As a result, many parties and other political associations took form in 1989. The new parties function as safety valves while Bendjedid, his close presidential circle, and the army that elevated him to power in 1979 seek to build a new social consensus to replace the order that was shattered in October, 1988.

The old order drew its legitimacy from the revolution of 1954–1962. By 1987, when the country celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence, that legitimacy was wearing thin. Behind the ceremonies, the parades and the fireworks of July, 1987, lay a deteriorating social situation. The economy was suffering from a steep decline in oil revenues; consumer goods and decent housing were in short supply; unemployment was on the rise; and people were grumbling about the life-style of the elite. Among the silver anniversary festivities, some 10,000 young people were organ-

ized to perform the "Algeriades," a patriotic spectacle of synchronized movements and marching in tribute to accomplishments since the war; 15 months later, other youths spilled into the streets in less synchronous fashion to ransack the Ministry of Youth. The young constitute the majority of Algeria's people; well over 60 percent of all Algerians have been born since independence. For many of them, the system erected by the wartime generation has failed.

October's social outburst also brought into the open divisions inside the Algerian state. These cleavages had been discernible for some time. Rivalry within the elite pitted Bendjedid and a circle of reform-minded associates against a band of party stalwarts ensconced within the apparatus of the FLN and the government bureaucracy. The party stood for the socialist ideology of the 1960's and 1970's, while Bendjedid tried to inject some liberal impulses into the economy. As long as the party maintained political hegemony, Bendjedid's gestures toward privatization and managerial reform were largely stifled. These internal factions were locked in a stalemate that the riots dislodged; but the revolt also unleashed other social forces, notably Islamist, that are challenging both the socialist and the liberal secular visions of Algeria.

For some time before the eruption, Bendjedid had been trying to push the system in new directions. As specialist John Entelis put it, the President was promoting perestroika without glasnost, seeking to restructure the economy without liberalizing political expression.¹ The events of October, 1988, dealt the death blow to this strategy.

Within a year of assuming office in January, 1979, Bendjedid began to chip away at the economic structures and policies that he inherited from Houari Boumedienne, Algeria's leader from 1965 to 1978.² Bendjedid's trademark, however, was cautious incrementalism within the ideological parameters established by the rigorously socialist National Charter of 1976, the document of national doctrine that Boumedienne designed at the height of his power. Only in February, 1985, one year into his second term, did Bendjedid challenge this ideo-

¹John P. Entelis, "Algeria under Chadli: Liberalization without Democratization or, *Perestroika*, Yes; *Glasnost*, No!" *Middle East Insight*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Fall, 1988), pp. 47–64.

²For analyses of earlier developments under Bendjedid, see *Current History*, December, 1981, and May, 1985.

logical heritage. In a major speech, Bendjedid announced that the country would review—and, where necessary, “enrich”—the charter, because “the revolution that bogs down in the name of principles is a revolution headed for failure.”³ The President apparently felt constrained by the charter’s strong emphasis on the FLN as a socialist vanguard party and on the state as the central manager of the economy. Inflexible adherence to these ideological principles, Bendjedid implied, was alienating increasing numbers of Algerians, some of whom were turning toward Islamic movements.

The weekly journal *Algérie-Actualité* emerged as the organ of the liberal reformers. It published an article, for example, denouncing the FLN as the “ministry of talk” staffed by politicians “of dubious competence, specialists in the arts of wooden speeches and purposeless meetings.” In rebuttal the party organ, *Révolution Africaine*, branded *Algérie-Actualité* the spokesman of “the bourgeoisie and reactionary forces . . . the dreamers of liberalism . . . the enemies of the revolution.”⁴ Kamel Belkacem, editor of *Algérie-Actualité* and of *Parcours Maghrébins* (a monthly cultural magazine) supported Bendjedid’s reform initiative with other articles calling for greater reliance on free enterprise and freedom of association, while the official trade union journal wrote that “the masses reject liberalism and reaffirm the socialist option.”

While this debate was conducted in the press, care was taken to keep the actual decision-making process tightly controlled as usual. Late in November, 1985, a draft of the revised text went to the central committee of the FLN, then in December it was sent to an extraordinary party congress that formally approved the document for submission to a popular referendum. Only then was the new version of the charter made public. It was revealed that the mountain of mass meetings and media exchanges had given birth to a mouse: there was no wholesale reconceptualization of ideology or institutions. The “foreword” to the new version declared euphemistically that a proper balance had been struck between continuity and innovation. Most observers perceived more of the former than the latter. Prominent among the continuations in the January, 1986, text were the institutional supremacy of the FLN as a single party and the dependence of the state on the party’s ideological leadership. Likewise, the new charter — Charter II — was unambiguous in reasserting that Algeria’s national goal was the establishment of a socialist society. In the view of the journal *Jeune Afrique*, the

outcome of the battle between reformists and orthodox socialists was a cosmetic job that rendered “Chadism” little more than “Boumediennism with a human face.”⁵

However flippant this formulation, the assessment was accurate. The new charter incorporated principles that justified certain policy changes that Bendjedid had already implemented, like the breakup of the biggest state firms into smaller units in the name of less centralized management. It adopted a somewhat softer tone toward national private capital in line with Bendjedid’s gestures toward the local bourgeoisie. Indeed, the overall rhetoric of the 1986 version was considerably less Marxist than the first charter, emphasizing nationalist themes and specifying that Algerian socialism was an authentic national concept, not a foreign doctrine. The entire “enrichment” exercise was not without some small gains for Bendjedid and the reformers, who felt more at ease with the tone of the new charter, but it also revealed the residual strength of the orthodox wing of the political elite. Certainly the President gained no mandate for more sweeping change.

Both wings of the ruling elite agreed on one key matter—the need to address the rising Islamist sentiment in the country. The new charter sought to preempt ideological challenges from Islamic fundamentalists. It devoted considerable attention to pre-Islamic Algeria, hailing the early “national” resistance of leaders like Massinissa and Jugurtha, who had sought to “preserve the unity of the state and its independence” from Roman imperialism. It continued at greater length to celebrate the cultural contribution of Islam to Algerian nationhood, yet pointedly insisted on Islam as a religion of social justice and equality. Only then did the charter introduce socialism as a methodology for achieving national liberation “in perfect conformity with the doctrine of Islam, which preaches social justice.”⁶ There is no evidence that this effort to co-opt the emergent Islamic movement had much impact. Nonetheless, the gesture indicated the wariness of the state regarding the restive elements in civil society.

The significance of the intra-elite skirmish over the National Charter was twofold. It revealed that as early as 1985, even before a decline in oil revenues began to strain the Algerian economy, elite consensus was breaking down. Competitive models of how to govern Algeria—one oriented to privatization and the other staunchly committed to the bureaucratized state—were already present behind the facade of a monolithic single-party regime. The stalemate that produced the less substantive revision showed that neither wing had clear dominance over the other. Second, the charter

³*Grand Maghreb* (Grenoble), no. 38, March 18, 1985.

⁴*Le Monde*, December 5, 1985.

⁵*Jeune Afrique*, no. 1305, January 8, 1986.

⁶*Projet de Charte Nationale* (Algiers, 1986), pp. 3, 8.

episode confirmed that the elite was well aware that various social forces were challenging the legitimacy of the statist order.

During the two and a half years after the official adoption of Charter II, the government had to navigate through an economic crisis brought on by the precipitous fall in oil prices. Export earnings plunged from some U.S.\$13 billion in 1985 to about \$8 billion per year, forcing a cutback in expenditures on imports and various subsidies. A rare budget deficit of \$2.4 billion occurred in 1987 and a slightly smaller deficit was reported in 1988. These economic strains subjected the population to unpopular austerity measures but convinced Bendjedid that his preference for policies of economic liberalization was all the more justified. He named 1987 the "year of autonomy of the enterprise," a formula intended to introduce much greater reliance on market mechanisms in the management of state enterprises." These included self-financing measures that permitted company executives to raise capital or reinvest earnings without authorization from government ministries; likewise, firms were authorized to contract directly for needed materials, eliminating bureaucratic middlemen. Coupled with various encouragements to private entrepreneurs, these measures constituted a de facto implementation of an economic model closer to Bendjedid's liberal policy preferences than to the professed socialist orientation of the charter.

Bendjedid also sent his close associate, El Hadi Khediri, whom he appointed minister of the interior, to the People's National Assembly to argue for a bill loosening restrictions on freedom of association. The Parliament, all of whose deputies were members of the FLN, was hesitant to pass legislation that might weaken the party's hegemony over voluntary associational life. After considerable lobbying, the liberal wing won passage of the bill in the hope of diffusing some social discontent.

Among the noteworthy manifestations of disaffection that worried Bendjedid and the reformists were student protests in Constantine and Sétif that turned violent in November, 1986, and a wave of armed attacks carried out in the latter part of 1985 and throughout 1986 by the "Bouiali band." Mustapha Bouiali was a wartime veteran who had become sufficiently alienated to form an underground dissident group vaguely inspired by Muslim fundamentalist ideals. He was killed by the police in a shoot-out in January, 1987; many of his followers were tried; and the group was dismantled. But Bouiali represented the small violent wing of a much larger, though relatively fragmented, Islamist movement.

On yet another front, there were challenges from Berber activists who organized a Human Rights

League, which the government first repressed and then outflanked by allowing a second human rights association to form.

While maneuvering Cabinet personnel to meet changing needs, Bendjedid never forgot to keep his fences mended with the military. The President favored the modernization and professionalization of an army whose roots lay in the *maquis* (resistance) and whose proclivities tended toward politics. He entrusted this mission to General Mostefa Benloucif, whom he named chief of staff in 1984. Benloucif was a professional officer committed to a well-trained, technically sophisticated military, armed with the most advanced (if need be, Western) weaponry. Benloucif's technocratic vision was not altogether congenial to some of the older officers who feared for their careers; rather than risk a revolt, Bendjedid subsequently fired Benloucif and replaced him with Abdallah Belhoucet, one of the old guard officers who, like Bendjedid, had been a member of Boumedienne's Council of the Revolution after the 1965 coup d'état.

In return for their institutional security, the army brass were reported to have assured Bendjedid of their support for his economic policies. The ouster of Benloucif was the most striking illustration of Bendjedid's need to guarantee the political loyalty of the army, which remains a key pillar of his power. Throughout 1987, he promoted several other officers to key commands, an unusual rate of turnover for Algeria's military.

THE OCTOBER CRISIS

During the summer of 1988, few events portended the October explosion. To be sure, this was the third successive summer of economic austerity, and there was much grumbling in the crowded urban neighborhoods. Yet complaints about shortages and government mismanagement had become the norm in Algeria; the cauldron was always simmering, but (with the exception of the Constantine riots of 1986) it never seemed to boil over. Everything seemed to be proceeding rather normally toward the scheduled December FLN congress, the first major party forum since the 1985 charter debate.

At the end of September, the pressure began to build in the form of strikes at the large industrial zone just east of Algiers. Workers at the state-owned industrial vehicles plant first struck when the management arbitrarily canceled a modest fringe benefit (a "toy bonus" worth about \$16 per employee's child) just at the moment when families needed to buy school supplies (which were in short supply and more expensive than usual). Other workers in the complex joined the strike, and on October 2, postal workers struck to claim a cost-of-living increase. At this point, rumors of a general strike

began to circulate. The rumors appear to have been the spark that triggered the explosion.

The first vandalism occurred on Tuesday evening, October 4; then on Wednesday morning, schoolchildren and unemployed young men swept out of the crowded neighborhoods onto the main commercial streets of Algiers wrecking everything in their path. What some called "the revolt of the young Algerians" and others dubbed the "couscous revolt" (alluding to only one of many shortages) was the outburst of accumulated frustrations that had abruptly reached the explosion point.⁷

There is no clear evidence that any coherent social group organized the outburst. During the disorder, some fundamentalist leaders sought to exploit events, but other leaders tried to calm the population. *Le Monde* reported some incidents of provocateurs inciting the rioters and firing shots to provoke the security forces.⁸ Elite opponents of Bendjedid's reforms may have tried to bring him down via popular chaos, but the eruption was essentially spontaneous.

The great tragedy of the October events lay in the regime's resort to inexcusable atrocities in restoring order. Throughout the spree of violence, the security forces fired into the crowds, which remained composed mainly of teenagers, made arbitrary arrests and tortured some prisoners. One victim claimed that, "by an irony of history, I was tortured 100 meters from the place where my father had been tortured by the French paratroopers."⁹ The unofficial death toll was 159; with hundreds more wounded and some 3,000 arrested. However costly the physical destruction caused by the rioters, the political cost of the repression ran higher.

Bendjedid emerged chastened from the crisis, but he was entrusted with the task of reform. He promptly proposed a modification of the Algerian constitution that would make the Prime Minister accountable to the National Assembly. Although modest in impact, the proposal shrewdly implied a shift from party to parliamentary rule that was responsive to widespread discontent with the FLN. Second, he encouraged various social groups—journalists, academics, professionals, students, workers, human rights groups—to speak out freely and vent their grievances. By way of response to their general criticism of a muffled society, Bendjedid announced a redefinition of the role of the single party; the FLN would revert to its pre-independence status as a genuine "front" in which a range of political viewpoints were represented.

⁷See Véronique Maurus in *Le Monde*, October 13, 1988.

⁸*Le Monde*, October 15, 1988.

⁹This testimony and many other eyewitness accounts of the repression appear in *Radio-Beur, October à Alger* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988); the quotation is on p. 99.

Moreover, it would abandon its pretension to hegemony over the state and its supervisory role over the various national organizations.

Then just before the early November referendum on the proposed constitutional revision, Bendjedid dismissed Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, the widely detested head of the party organization. In his place, he named Abdelhamid Mehri, recalled from the embassy in Morocco, a respected figure who personified the idea of a far more open front-type party. These moves were designed to democratize the existing structure without actually admitting the concept of a multiparty system, a departure that Bendjedid explicitly ruled out in an October 24 statement. Finally, on the eve of the referendum, he fired the army's security chief for the excesses of the state of emergency, and pardoned those still held in jail for rioting.

The November 3 referendum thus became a vote of confidence in the President's intentions. To be sure, there was no obvious alternative, but the 83 percent turnout and the approval rate of 92 percent restored a measure of stability to Bendjedid's leadership. Two days after his victory, he appointed Kasdi Merbah Prime Minister, a bold choice that nonetheless raised a number of questions. Merbah, a Kabyle with a law degree and an army career, was known for his competence and even more for his toughness, having served Boumedienne as head of military security throughout his administration. Indeed, in 1978, he had been considered a possible successor to Boumedienne before throwing his support to Bendjedid. Since 1979, he had served successively as secretary general and vice minister of the Ministry of Defense, then as minister of heavy industry (1982–1984), minister of agriculture (1984–1988) and minister of health (February–November, 1988), all key political posts that he had handled effectively.

His competence therefore was above question, yet he was also seen as a military hardliner who might not be in total agreement with Bendjedid's liberal leanings. Whether the selection of Merbah represented administrative efficacy or a reassertion of the primacy of the military—or a little of both—was open to speculation. No one could deny, however, that Bendjedid had opted for a forceful personality who would bring stature to the office.

Merbah promptly appointed a new Cabinet in which all the key ministries went to new faces;

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Robert A. Mortimer's most recent book, co-authored with Naomi Chazan, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, is *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988).

"There is little chance that a Sahara settlement, once reached, will fall apart. It has taken the key players a long time to move toward a solution. And both sides would go to some lengths to protect this agreement against interference by a disgruntled third party like Libya."

Morocco and the Western Sahara

BY JOHN DAMIS

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THE unresolved conflict over the Western (formerly Spanish) Sahara has been the dominant issue in Morocco since 1974, in domestic politics and in foreign policy. The Sahara issue reflects a strong belief in the Moroccan body politic that Morocco has a valid claim to the territory as an integral part of the national patrimony that was claimed by Spain from 1884 to 1976. The campaign to recover the Western Sahara transformed Moroccan politics in 1974–1975 from internal division and malaise to national unity.¹

During the past 15 years, this campaign has led to cooperation between the government of King Hassan II and several elements of the opposition. As a national crusade, the Sahara issue significantly boosted the fortunes of the monarchy. It allowed the government to open up the political system in 1976–1977. The critical importance of the Sahara question has also permitted the government to use the issue as a justification for tactical manipulations in domestic politics.

Morocco's efforts to recover the Western Sahara have been actively and consistently opposed since 1975 by the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro). In February, 1976, when Spain withdrew from the territory, the Polisario proclaimed the creation of an independent Saharan state, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). With virtually no resources of its own, the front has necessarily depended heavily on diplomatic support and on military, economic and basic food and water supplies from Algeria and, until 1983, from Libya.

In the late 1970's, a series of aggressive, well-

coordinated Polisario attacks against isolated Moroccan garrisons in the northern Sahara forced the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) to take the defensive. The Sahara's territory of over 100,000 square miles was too vast to be pacified and controlled by the FAR, especially against a highly mobile guerrilla force that could operate from a territorial sanctuary in southwest Algeria. On the other hand, the Polisario Front, whose forces never exceeded 12,000, could not drive the well-equipped Moroccan Army of up to 100,000 out of the Sahara. For a few years, the Sahara conflict had the makings of an open-ended but indecisive war of attrition.

During the 1980's, however, the FAR was able to reverse the military trend, end the stalemate, and turn the tide of battle strongly in its favor. In 1980, the Moroccan high command adopted a strategy of constructing a long defensive wall to protect the Sahara's few population centers and the rich phosphate deposits at Bu Craa. The first wall, begun in September, 1980, enclosed the "useful triangle" of the northern Sahara, about one-sixth of the total territory. New walls were built to the south and east to enclose ever larger areas of the Sahara. The sixth wall, completed in April, 1987, is about 1,100 miles long and encloses about 80 percent of the disputed territory, including all the major population centers.

Morocco's Great Wall is protected by barbed wire and mines and is equipped with a combination of three sophisticated early warning systems, depending on the terrain. The Great Wall is further reinforced by observation points and fortified bases of operation installed at varying distances, again depending on the nature of the terrain.

The Great Wall has deprived the Polisario of its major tactical advantage—the ability to launch surprise hit-and-run attacks against isolated FAR garrisons. Serving as a trap for vehicles, the defensive barrier can block access into the territory under Moroccan administration. Though not impregnable, the Great Wall greatly inhibits fast escape for Polisario units trying to operate within the protected zone. While Polisario forces continue to attack at irregular intervals, they are able to inflict

¹For the background of various aspects of the Western Sahara conflict and Morocco's involvement in that conflict, see Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill; London: Croom Helm, 1983), updated edition published in French translation as *Sahara occidental: Origines et enjeux d'une guerre du désert* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987); John Damis, *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983); I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, updated edition (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapter 2; and Nicole Grimaud, "Sahara occidental: Une issue possible?" *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 121 (July-September, 1988), pp. 89–98.

only limited damage; if they breach the wall, they can remain inside only a short time before they risk being trapped and destroyed by FAR intervention battalions that respond in force. Long on equipment but short on manpower, the Polisario appears to be losing a war of attrition. The Great Wall, along with improved army-air force coordination, more aggressive tactics and more effective use of French- and American-supplied weapons, has enabled the FAR to gain a high degree of control over the battlefield.

DIPLOMATIC FRUSTRATION

Morocco's success on the battlefield has not been matched in the diplomatic arena. Here the Polisario, with strong backing from Algeria, has gradually been able to increase international support for the SADR. From the beginning, Rabat has had to wage an uphill diplomatic battle with the Polisario because the Moroccan position is difficult to defend in international forums. Third world nations tend to be supportive of the principle of self-determination, which has been reaffirmed in many United Nations (UN) resolutions. Against this widely held principle of self-determination, the Moroccan argument of territorial integrity has not been persuasive. The developed nations have usually preferred to avoid taking sides in what they see as a regional dispute. The result of this stacked diplomatic deck is that, with the temporary exception of Mauritania, no country has yet recognized Moroccan sovereignty in the Western Sahara. In sharp contrast, 73 countries have recognized the SADR, including Yugoslavia in 1984 and India in 1985.

The major diplomatic struggle over the Sahara issue was played out in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). By 1980, 26 of the 50 OAU members backed the admission of the SADR. Morocco employed a variety of tactics to delay the SADR's admission to the OAU until the November, 1984, summit. When the SADR was finally admitted at the meeting, Morocco immediately withdrew from the OAU. Later, Morocco restored relations with a few countries (including Angola and Cape Verde in 1987) that recognize the SADR. At the same time, four countries—Equatorial

Guinea, Saint Lucia, the Solomon Islands and the Dominican Republic—have withdrawn their recognition of the SADR.

ECONOMIC COSTS

The Polisario has recognized that it cannot impose a military defeat on Morocco, a nation of 25 million people. Nevertheless, the front's long-term strategy is to tie down a large Moroccan Army in a protracted war whose costs will finally prove too expensive. In this scenario, a growing economic crisis within Morocco would force King Hassan to abandon the campaign to recover the Sahara. In 1983, after several years of drought and poor harvests, depressed world prices for phosphate and basic structural problems forced Morocco to begin rescheduling payments on some of its foreign loans. Estimates of the Sahara war expenses ran as high as U.S.\$1 billion a year, giving the Polisario reason to believe that Morocco could not sustain such an economic burden indefinitely.

In retrospect, the cost of the Sahara war has been bearable for Morocco. Although it is difficult to calculate with any precision the cost of the Sahara campaign, it is clear that the war has represented a large additional expense over and above Morocco's other defense spending. Assuming a normal growth of defense spending from pre-1975 levels and a 50 percent increase from the Sahara war, the Western Sahara increment would account for about one-third of total defense spending. For the 11-year period from 1976 to 1986, this increment amounted to \$2.8 billion, or about \$250 million a year.² With the Great Wall firmly in place and fully equipped, it is unlikely that Morocco's military costs in the Sahara have increased since 1986, nor are they likely to rise in the foreseeable future.

Military expenditures represent only part of the cost of Morocco's Sahara campaign. Large additional expenditures have been spent on a variety of civilian projects ranging from basic economic infrastructure (roads, ports, water supplies, administration buildings) to social services (houses, schools, hospitals, job training, administration salaries).³ Civilian expenditures in the four provinces of the Western Sahara totaled about \$2.5 billion between 1976 and 1989, or about \$180 million a year. About two-thirds of this total represented capital expenditures and one-third, current expenditures. Most of the total was allocated to Laayoune province, where nearly two-thirds of the population lives.⁴ The primary objective of these expenditures was to win the hearts and minds of the resident Sahrawi population. Over the longer term, the Moroccan government hopes to recoup its investment from profits from Saharan fisheries and phosphates.

²This calculation is based on World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures on actual, rather than authorized, spending by the Moroccan government. It is a reasonable estimate, taking into account pre-1975 military spending trends and Morocco's security concerns since 1975 vis-à-vis Algeria, apart from the Western Sahara war.

³For details of these civilian projects, see John Damis, "Letter from El Ayoun," *Middle East International*, no. 333 (September 9, 1988), p. 24.

⁴These calculations for civilian expenditures are based on figures supplied to the author by Moroccan officials during a visit to the Western Sahara in May-June, 1988.

The combined military and civilian costs of Morocco's Sahara campaign have been about \$430 million a year. For the period 1976–1986, this represented only about 9 percent of government spending and about 3 percent of Morocco's gross domestic product (GDP). Much of the cost of Morocco's Sahara campaign was covered by generous aid from Saudi Arabia, conservatively estimated at \$1 billion a year from 1979 to 1981. Saudi aid to Morocco reportedly fell in 1982 to one-third its former level and has probably averaged less than \$500 million a year since then. At the same time, however, Morocco's general economic performance has improved considerably since 1983, when the government began to implement a restructuring program under pressure from international lending institutions.

Morocco has had record harvests for the past three years, an economic growth rate of over 10 percent, low inflation (2.3 percent), increased exports and a sharply reduced budget deficit. While Morocco is still burdened with a large external debt approaching \$20 billion, its economic performance in recent years has favorably impressed many outside observers.⁵ In view of the importance of the Western Sahara as a national objective and the relatively modest portion of government spending devoted to that objective, the financial burden of the Sahara campaign should remain manageable for Morocco for the foreseeable future.

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ALGERIA

From the beginning, Moroccans blamed Algeria for the continuing conflict in the Sahara, and they viewed the Polisario as an artificial creation staffed by and composed of Algerian mercenaries. Moroccans argued that Algerian support for Saharan self-determination was pragmatic and opportunistic. In the Moroccan view, Algeria first supported Moroccan claims to the Sahara in 1974 and 1975 but then, in pursuit of long-held ambitions to dominate North Africa, reversed its position and opposed Morocco. Moroccans viewed their conflict in the Sahara as a struggle not against a phantom national liberation movement but rather against a rival state.

Moroccans thus attached considerable significance to their country's recent rapprochement with Algeria. In May, 1988, Morocco reestablished full diplomatic relations with Algeria. The reestablishment of relations ended a 12-year break that began in March, 1976, when Algeria recognized the SADR. The 1988 diplomatic breakthrough fol-

lowed a series of high-level meetings over several months. In the joint communiqué issued when relations were reestablished, both sides reaffirmed all previous bilateral treaties, accords and conventions, and called for a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict by referendum.

In the following weeks, ambassadors were exchanged, the common frontier was opened, the two national airlines began regular service between the major cities of Morocco and Algeria, and a number of bilateral commissions began to explore avenues of economic cooperation. In July, 1988, the two countries linked their electricity grids through a high-tension 20-megawatt line. Finally, during the unprecedented visit of Algerian President Chadli Bédjedid to five Moroccan cities during his highly publicized three-day meetings with King Hassan on February 6–8, 1989, the two leaders agreed to go ahead with the \$2.2-billion Trans-Maghreb Gas Pipeline, which will run from the gas fields of northwest Algeria across northern Morocco to Spain and eventually to France and possibly Great Britain.

The two countries desired a rapprochement for a variety of reasons. First, Morocco hopes for Algerian cooperation in the search for a settlement of the Sahara dispute. Second, Algeria offers a promising market for Moroccan exports. In addition, for both sides, improved relations will reduce defense expenditures; the rapprochement is also a precondition for Maghrebi economic integration, which will help both countries face the challenge posed by the unified trade policies of the European Community (EC) by the end of 1992.

On the Algerian side, factors that encouraged movement toward and continuing support of a rapprochement with Morocco include declining oil and natural gas revenues, necessitating economic austerity measures that leave less margin for supporting the Polisario war effort; the success of Moroccan military strategy in the Sahara—the Great Wall—in reducing the effectiveness of Polisario military operations; the myriad inefficiencies of the Algerian economy, especially in the realm of heavy industry, and the attraction of Moroccan agricultural and citrus production for the poorly supplied Algerian market.

PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Prospects for a political settlement of the 15-year-old Western Sahara conflict have improved significantly since mid-1987. A series of concessions and accommodations by both Morocco and Algeria have removed most of the key obstacles.

Movement toward a settlement began in earnest in July, 1987. In the context of his state visit to the United Kingdom, King Hassan gave an interview in which he ended Morocco's long-held insistence

⁵For an upbeat account of Morocco's economic prospects, see Véronique Maurus, "Le Maroc, nouveau 'dragon' aux portes de l'Europe," *Le Monde*, November 4, 1989, p. 9.

that Algeria is a party to the Sahara conflict. This was a clear signal that Morocco was interested in improving relations with Algeria, and it was followed by a series of high-level meetings between the two countries between September, 1987, and May, 1988. The meetings eventually produced sufficient bilateral understanding to permit the reestablishment of relations on May 16, 1988. The joint communiqué issued that day contained no mention of Algeria's often-stated public position that direct Moroccan-Polisario negotiations are a precondition to a settlement of the Sahara conflict. This position was conspicuous by its absence and implied a significant concession by Algeria.

In November, 1988, a month after serious riots in several Algerian cities, President Chadli Bendjedid removed from power two key pro-Polisario members of his regime, Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi and Mohamad Cherif Messaadia, deputy secretary general of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). In December, Morocco softened its stance toward the Polisario Front. In place of the usual reference to "Algerian mercenaries," King Hassan used the phrase "Sahrawis of the Tindouf Group" and publicly declared for the first time his willingness to meet with the Polisario.

Thus, on January 4-5, 1989, King Hassan received a delegation of three high-level Polisario officials at his palace in Marrakesh. Though the talks broke no new ground, they marked the first Moroccan public meeting with the Polisario. The Polisario then sought direct negotiations with Morocco. Hassan, however, insisted that he had granted an audience only to listen to the Polisario's grievances. The Polisario would like follow-up talks with Morocco but as of January, 1990, the King was refusing to agree to a second meeting.

In May, 1989, King Hassan ratified the 1972 border treaty with Algeria. This treaty had been ratified by Algeria in 1973, and Morocco's prolonged delayed in ratification had constituted a festering sore. The King's belated ratification definitively ended a dispute that had flared into a brief war between Morocco and Algeria in 1963 over their common frontier.

While Morocco and Algeria have moved closer to a settlement, UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar has lent his good offices to assist efforts within the region to end the conflict. A UN technical fact-finding mission toured the area in the fall of 1987 and presented its findings to Pérez de Cuéllar in January, 1988. After several months of quiet diplomacy, on August 11 of that year the Secretary General sent his proposals for a settlement to Moroccan and Polisario representatives. These proposals reportedly offered a referendum to

choose between independence and integration into Morocco, and dealt with the identification of voter rights and the disposition of the Moroccan military during the organization of a referendum. At the end of August, both Morocco and the Polisario Front conditionally accepted the UN proposals.

In late October, 1988, Pérez de Cuéllar appointed Hector Gros Espiell, a French-speaking Uruguayan lawyer who is a well-known trouble-shooter, as his special representative for the Western Sahara question. Since his appointment, Gros has been actively involved in the search for a settlement; his mandate has been to narrow the differences between Morocco and Algeria and then arrange for a referendum on self-determination, administered by the UN, in the disputed territory. Pérez de Cuéllar made a six-day trip to northwest Africa in June, 1989, to assess the possibilities of a diplomatic solution, and during this trip he met with King Hassan. The visit was followed in July by meetings between the UN Technical Mission established in 1987 and Moroccan and Polisario representatives. After these meetings, Gros reported to the Secretary General; the report is said to have recommended limiting the referendum to Sahrawis listed in an official census carried out by the Spanish in 1974.

Very little progress was made, however, in achieving full acceptance by both parties of Pérez de Cuéllar's 1988 settlement proposals. While the UN can assist the search for a settlement, the Secretary General and his representative cannot force concessions from the parties. On the formal level, the key difficulties remain the establishment and maintenance of a durable cease-fire, the procedural problems of the deployment of the Moroccan Army and administration before and during a referendum, and the verification of eligible voters. Behind these formal issues are irreconcilable political differences between Morocco's determination to maintain control over the Western Sahara and the Polisario Front's undiminished desire for an independent Saharan state. Since the spring of 1988, Moroccan determination has been stiffened by the rapprochement with Algeria; the Moroccan government assumes that in time the Algerian leadership will pressure the Polisario to make major compromises.

In order to resolve these difficulties—and, in the
(Continued on page 184)

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"The honesty and dedication of Bourguiba's successor have brightened the mood in Tunisia and . . . the country has made significant progress in its quest for democratization. Yet there are formidable obstacles to further progress, suggesting that Tunisia's political future may be less certain."

Tunisia's New Beginning

BY MARK TESSLER

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IT is possible to distinguish three broad periods in the political history of independent Tunisia. In the first, following independence in 1956, the country appeared to be a model for successful modernization. There were problems and difficulties, to be sure. Nevertheless, led by its dynamic President, Habib Bourguiba, who was also the hero of the nation's struggle against French colonialism, Tunisia approached its quest for development with energy, dedication and a coherent plan. This period lasted until the late 1960's.

The second period, encompassing the 1970's and most of the 1980's, was much more gloomy. Many Tunisians, especially the young, lost faith in the country's political system, coming to view national leaders and institutions as dedicated primarily to the maintenance of their own privileged position and only secondly to the welfare of the nation as a whole. Aggregate economic gains were registered during part of this period. Yet the gap between rich and poor increased substantially; and the living standard of many Tunisians declined in absolute terms as well, sowing the seeds of social and political unrest.

The third period did not begin until 1987 and its defining contours are still taking shape. Nevertheless, marked by the emergence of a new leadership team, headed by President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, there has been a sharp break with the recent past. Ben Ali has proclaimed a new beginning and made a transition to democracy his highest priority. He has also been able to persuade most Tunisians that significant gains can be made. Although serious challenges confront the new government, the mood in Tunisia in 1988 and 1989 was characterized by anticipation and hope and, in this respect, resembled that of the immediate post-independence era.

Tunisia had a coherent and highly institutionalized approach to nation-building during the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's.¹ The country was

governed by a single, mass-based, mobilization-oriented political party, the Destourian Socialist party (PSD), which sought to foster popular political participation through its network of 1,250 local committees. Thousands of Tunisians attended regular PSD meetings and took part in other activities organized by the party.

Consistent with this emphasis on the mobilization of human resource capital, the country spent heavily on education. It invested nearly 25 percent of its budget in this area each year and the percentage of children attending primary school rose from 25 percent in 1956 to about 70 percent a decade later. Another area of concern was social and cultural reform. For example, Tunisia introduced legislation banning polygamy and unilateral divorce and took other measures that were designed to promote women's emancipation. The government pursued a socialist strategy of economic development during this period, an effort that included the establishment of cooperatives for agricultural production.

Tunisia changed course in the 1970's, in part because its economy was not performing well. Despite important gains relating to education and political mobilization, aggregate growth was lagging and the country was unable to create enough jobs to satisfy the demands of a rapidly expanding population. There was also opposition to socialist programs from the middle class and, in some cases, from peasants and small landholders.

The shift in political and economic orientation also reflected a change of leadership. The country's dynamic President, Habib Bourguiba, became ill and was required to spend long periods abroad for treatment; and a struggle among would-be successors led to the removal of the most important architects of Tunisian socialism and the installation in their place of men with a more laissez-faire approach to development. This new orientation was retained when Bourguiba regained his health and returned to active leadership in the early 1970's. The capitalist development strategy to which Tunisia then turned included an expansion of the pri-

¹See Charles Micaud, with Leon Carl Brown and Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964).

vate sector and the pursuit of foreign investment.

The Tunisian economy performed better in aggregate terms during the 1970's and early 1980's, although some argued that this was not necessarily the result of a change in economic orientation. The discovery and export of petroleum in the 1970's added roughly 20 percent to Tunisia's gross domestic product (GDP). But while aggregate growth was considerable, there were also problems, including a marked increase in government corruption, a deterioration in the living standard of the lower classes, and an increase in the gap between rich and poor. In the latter case, the income inequality ratio increased from 1:36 in the late 1960's to 1:45 by the early 1980's, with the richest 20 percent of the population consuming 50 percent of the nation's wealth while the poorest 20 percent consumed only 5 percent. In the agricultural sector, landowners possessing 3 percent of all farms controlled half the country's cultivable land.

The difficult circumstances of young people also contributed to political tensions during the 1970's and 1980's. With over 60 percent of the population under the age of 25, there was a growing demand for jobs and other opportunities for personal mobility that the government was unable to accommodate.² As a result, many primary school graduates were unable to continue their education, and among urban young men under the age of 30 (especially those with little or no post-primary schooling), estimates of the proportion without regular employment ranged as high as 50 percent.

Finally, political life became stagnant during the 1970's and 1980's. Single-party rule continued but the PSD abandoned its mobilization orientation. Its machinery atrophied at the grass-roots level, opportunities for popular participation all but disappeared, and there were increasing complaints about the suppression of political dissent.³ Many Tunisians also complained that political leaders seemed more interested in protecting their own privileges

than in attacking problems of underdevelopment.

All this led many Tunisians to turn toward Islamic movements as a vehicle for expressing discontent. The growth of Islamic movements assumed significant proportions in the 1970's and early 1980's.⁴ Militant Muslim groups were especially successful in attracting the young, including those who were relatively well-educated, with high schools and university campuses serving as centers of activity and recruitment.⁵ Islamic groups demanded greater attention to Muslim social codes, as well as political and economic reform.

The frustration of those with little hope of a better life also led to violence and rioting. The most violent disturbances took place in January, 1984.⁶ For more than a week there were protests and demonstrations throughout the country. In Tunis, thousands of students, workers and unemployed young men from the city's slums roamed the streets, shouting anti-government slogans, destroying cars and buses, looting and setting fire to shops and, in some areas, attacking public buildings. By the time order was restored, security forces had killed over 150 people.

BEN ALI'S TAKEOVER

On November 7, 1987, Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali, then Tunisia's Prime Minister, assumed the duties of President.⁷ Responding to the deepening political malaise, Ben Ali invoked Article 57 of the Tunisian constitution, which stipulates that the duties and functions of the President shall be performed by the Prime Minister should the head of state become incapacitated. On the night of November 6, Ben Ali assembled a panel of seven doctors who signed a report stating that Bourguiba's physical and mental health had deteriorated to such an extent that he could no longer perform the responsibilities of his office. The next day he removed Bourguiba from office and became the second President in the history of independent Tunisia.

Although Ben Ali had become Prime Minister only a few weeks earlier, and had joined the Cabinet as minister of the interior only in April, 1986, few questioned his action. The 84-year-old President was increasingly out of touch with the nation's problems. Indeed, Ben Ali himself used the word "senile" in describing the President's condition. Older Tunisians remembered Bourguiba's early contributions with fondness and appreciation, but stated that the time for his retirement had long since passed. Younger Tunisians, who had not lived through the struggle for independence and had only dim recollections of the dynamic years after independence, were often less charitable.

The immediate catalyst for Ben Ali's action was Bourguiba's unwillingness to accept verdicts hand-

²See James Allman, "Social Mobility After Independence," in Russell A. Stone and John Simmons, eds., *Change in Tunisia: Studies in the Social Sciences* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976). See also Mark Tessler and Mary Keppel, "Political Generations," in Stone and Simmons, op. cit.

³Russell Stone, "Tunisia: A Single-Party System Holds Change in Abeyance," in I. William Zartman et al., *Political Elites in Arab North Africa* (New York: Longman, 1982).

⁴Mark Tessler, "Political Change and the Islamic Revival in Tunisia," *The Maghreb Review*, vol. 5 (1980), pp. 8-19.

⁵See Elbaki Hermassi, "La société tunisienne au miroir islamiste," *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 103 (1984), pp. 39-56. See also Susan Waltz, "The Islamist Appeal in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 40 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 651-671.

⁶James Paul, "States of Emergency: The Riots in Tunisia and Morocco," *MERIP Reports*, no. 127 (October, 1984).

⁷L.B. Ware, "Ben Ali's Constitutional Coup in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 42 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 587-601.

ed down in the trials of Islamic militants in September, 1987. For several years Bourguiba had been attempting to suppress Islamic movements opposed to his policies, including both the moderate Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), led by Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou, and more radical groups operating independently of the MTI. Ghannouchi was arrested in March, 1987, by Ben Ali in his capacity as minister of the interior, and other Islamist figures were detained in August and charged with responsibility for bombing tourist hotels in the Sahel region. However, when the Islamists were tried in September by the State Security Court on charges of plotting to overthrow the government, Bourguiba judged the sentences to be too lenient and ordered a new trial. He also insisted that some Islamists receive death sentences.

Particularly upsetting to Bourguiba was the failure of the September trials to demonstrate that the MTI was a subversive organization.⁸ Ghannouchi's testimony portrayed an organization seeking merely to participate in the political system and to introduce an Islamic perspective into debates over national policy. Acknowledging that there were also more radical elements within the broader community of Muslim activists, Ghannouchi convincingly argued that radicalism was not inherent in the Islamist movement but was the result of government suppression, which had convinced some of its followers that legitimate political activity was not possible and had driven them underground.⁹

Bourguiba's fixation on the Islamists and his attempt to interfere in the judicial process set the stage for Ben Ali's move against him. Moreover, not only did additional doubts about Bourguiba's fitness emerge in this context, but Ben Ali judged that further action against the MTI would intensify opposition to the government and further weaken its already shaky position. Ben Ali feared that if the Islamists had been retried and given harsher sentences, major disturbances might have followed. Other knowledgeable Tunisians concurred.

Ben Ali brought a military background to his position as Tunisia's new President. Having studied at military institutions in France and in the United States, he was a trusted supporter of Bourguiba's and one of the army's leaders after independence. Between 1958 and 1980, except for three years as Tunisian military attaché in Morocco, he was director of military security. In 1980, he became

⁸Hedi Dhokar, "Bourguiba contre les islamistes," *Jeune Afrique*, September 30, 1987, pp. 28-32.

⁹Hedi Dhokar, "Ce que Ghannouchi a dit à la police," *Jeune Afrique*, October 7, 1987, pp. 6-17.

¹⁰Further information about Ben Ali's background is provided by François Poli and Souhayr Belhassen, "Tunisie: un homme nouveau," *Jeune Afrique*, July 9, 1986, pp. 9-15. See also Ware, op. cit., pp. 593-595.

Tunisia's ambassador to Poland but was brought home after the riots of January, 1984, first to resume his post as director of military security and then, in October, to become secretary of state for national defense. In April, 1986, he became minister of the interior and in October, 1987, he assumed the position of Prime Minister.¹⁰

While Ben Ali's military background might have suggested that he would deal harshly with opponents, the new President immediately signaled that movement toward democracy would be his top priority. His inaugural address called for constitutional reform, including repeal of the provision authorizing a "President for life," and in July, 1988, the National Assembly passed an amendment stipulating that a President can be re-elected only twice. At Ben Ali's urging, the legislature also abolished the State Security Court, which Bourguiba had utilized to suppress Islamist and other critics of his regime. The post of prosecutor general of the republic was abolished as well. In addition, a more liberal press law was adopted and authorization was given for a chapter of Amnesty International.

Most important, Ben Ali instituted a program of amnesty for political prisoners, issuing pardons and according clemency to many opponents of the previous government. In December, 1987, for example, 18 members of the Islamic Liberation party and 608 members of the MTI were released from detention, and a Muslim extremist who had been condemned to death had his sentence commuted to life in prison. Ghannouchi was pardoned in May, 1988, and by summer more than 4,000 political prisoners, representing all shades of ideological opinion, had been freed.

The new government also took action with respect to programs and institutions bearing directly on Islam. In a highly symbolic gesture, the Faculty of Theology of the University of Tunis was renamed the Zitouna Faculty of Theology. The institution had been the Zitouna Mosque University before Bourguiba incorporated it into the state-run university after independence. The Higher Islamic Council, whose responsibilities include the governance of Zitouna, was enlarged, made more representative, given greater authority in matters of curriculum and instruction and authorized to publish a new religious magazine. The budget of the council was increased as well. Other government efforts to be responsive to Islamic opinion included the addition of the Muslim calendar to the official register, the broadcast of calls for prayer on radio and television and a promise to consult the Higher Islamic Council about programs with religious content.

THE EMERGING POLITICAL SYSTEM

Ben Ali's initial statements and actions, like his

seizure of power, were extremely popular. But the need to give direction to Tunisia's new beginning and to match performance to aspiration remained important challenges.

An attempt to build a consensus for meeting these challenges was the initiation of a political debate designed to lead to the formulation of a national pact.¹¹ In April, 1988, Ben Ali invited all political and social factions to participate in the definition of a document that would identify the most important problems facing the country and establish the principles that would guide efforts to deal with these problems. The purpose of this pact was to "define a common denominator and a minimum of principles on which all Tunisians can agree and which can be adopted as a basis for political action and development."

The national pact, concluded exactly one year after Ben Ali took power, was a success to the extent that it articulated a consensus most political factions were prepared to endorse. Signing the document were representatives of six political parties, five of which were small opposition movements, including the Tunisian Communist party. Other signatories included the National Union of Tunisian Women, the League for the Defense of Human Rights and various labor and professional organizations. A representative of the Islamist movement signed as well, although he indicated that he was signing only for himself.

The content of the 13-page pact remained general, identifying common denominators but providing only limited guidance for political action. The pact dealt with four general areas: national identity, political life, economic development and foreign relations. Tunisia's national identity was said to be based on a liberal interpretation of Islam, on the country's tradition of openness to other civilizations, and on its historic "vocation" of reconciling fidelity to Islam with the demands of the modern world. Provisions pertaining to political life emphasized a commitment to human rights and political freedoms, including freedom of religion and the right to form political parties. The economic section stressed the need to provide a satisfactory living standard for all Tunisians and stated that both the public sector and the private sector have a role in economic development. The discussion of foreign relations emphasized solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world and the desirability of Maghreb unity.

¹¹Lisa Anderson, "The National Pact: Tunisia in Latin American Perspective," paper presented at the Tunisia Country Day Program of the School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., April 4-15, 1989.

¹²Dirk Vandewalle, "Ben Ali's New Tunisia," *Universities Field Staff International Reports, 1989-1990*, no. 8, p. 4.

Among the accomplishments of the national pact are the inclusive nature of the deliberations surrounding its adoption, its formal commitment to human rights and economic justice (goals largely ignored by the previous government), and its contractual character, which encourages signatories to hold one another accountable for progress toward its objectives. Yet it does not represent the soul-searching hoped for by some Tunisian intellectuals, and it eschews the difficult decision-making that would have been necessary to make it a blueprint for action. Interestingly, some members of Ben Ali's own party objected to the pact, fearing that it might reduce their own prerogatives.¹² Critics, in contrast, state that it strengthens the regime, enabling it to allege bad faith on the part of those who signed the pact but oppose particular government actions.

Political activity during 1988 included the formation of a new government and preparation for presidential and legislative elections. The Cabinet appointed in July, 1988, contained 32 members as well as the President; 24 members held the rank of minister. In addition to Ben Ali, the most important members of the government were Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche, a veteran politician and long-time friend of the new President, and Minister of the Interior Habib Ammar. Ammar, one of the President's closest political allies, had played an important role in the Ben Ali takeover but was removed from his position later in the year because of a business scandal involving his son. Ammar's dismissal showed Ben Ali's determination to protect the government's reputation for honesty. Although initially permitted to remain in the Cabinet as a special presidential adviser, Ammar was made ambassador to Austria in June, 1989, and quietly left the country.

There were four legal political parties at the time of Ben Ali's constitutional coup. In addition to the PSD, the ruling party founded by Bourguiba, there were the Social Democratic Movement (MDS), the Popular Unity party (PUP) and the Tunisian Communist party (PCT). All three are small parties of the left, although the MDS is considered liberal rather than left. The position of the MDS also reflects the prominence of its leader, Ahmed Mestiri, a former Cabinet minister who was influential within the PSD until the early 1970's. All three opposition parties have suffered harassment in the

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Mark Tessler is the coauthor of *Political Elites in Arab North Africa* (New York: Longman, 1982), *The Evaluation and Application of Survey Research in the Arab World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), and *Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON NORTH AFRICA

THE GREEN AND THE BLACK: QADDAFI'S POLICIES IN AFRICA. *Edited by René Lemarchand.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 184 pages and index, \$29.95.)

This collection, edited by René Lemarchand, is a laudable contribution to correcting American popular stereotypes with regard to Libya. In his preface, Lemarchand notes pointedly that the fixation on Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi as a "mad dog" blinded Americans to a realistic perspective on Libya and what made Qaddafi behave as he has. Lemarchand addresses this question directly in the leading chapter, "Beyond the Mad Dog Syndrome."

The collection is divided into two sections; the first is focused on Libyan internal dynamics (the military, the role of Islam and Qaddafi's doctrine) and the second on Libya in a regional context (Chad, Morocco and the Maghreb, and black Africa). Contributors include Mary-Jane Deeb, E.G.H. Joffe, Mark Tessler, Ronald Bruce St. John and Jean-Emmanuel Pondi. At a moment when Qaddafi appears to be trying to change his negative, terrorist image in the West, the analyses presented here are especially useful.

Debra E. Soled

IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA, 1969-1982. *By Mahmoud G. ElWarfally.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 187 pages, notes and index, \$29.95.)

This monograph is best read as a companion to Lemarchand's collection. It concentrates on a narrower discussion of United States policy toward Libya under Presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan (omitting Gerald Ford). The main thrust of this analysis is the connection between the subjective images formed by decision makers and their subsequent policy choices (which are assumed to be based on "rational," "objective" problem solving).

The author concludes that in the case of Libya, American perception of the extent to which the Soviet Union was hostile toward the United States and Libya's degree of hostility (or warmth) toward the Soviet Union conditioned United States policy toward Libya (despite Libya's attitude on other important issues and its terrorist activities); this construct held true to a greater extent for the policies of Ronald Reagan and to a

lesser extent for the policies of Jimmy Carter. El-Warfally predicts that this will continue to be the case as long as the United States considers its competition with the Soviet Union to be its dominant strategic concern.

D.E.S.

THE MAKING OF CONTEMPORARY ALGERIA, 1830-1987. *By Mahfoud Bennoune.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 311 pages, notes and index, \$54.50).

Dividing Algerian modern history into two periods, colonial (1830-1962) and post-independence (1962-1987), Bennoune discusses the issue of economic development in Algeria. He argues that the institutionalization of democracy is directly related to economic development: democracy promotes and consolidates development, and the attainment of development, in turn, is the realization of a fully democratic polity.

Although exposure to French culture introduced West European political ideology, French colonialism hampered Algerian indigenous economic development by its very nature as an agent of foreign appropriation. The legacy of France's 132 years of colonialism continues to influence Algerian society. In 1962, Algeria gained nominal independence. To claim real independence, Algeria will have to throw off this legacy and attain political democracy.

D.E.S.

CULTURE AND COUNTERCULTURE IN MOROCCAN POLITICS. *By John P. Entelis.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. 131 pages, references, bibliography and index, \$26.50.)

This examination of culture and politics in Morocco presents four competing orientations that form the current consensus. At present they interact in relative harmony, but Entelis warns that the future depends on the "monarchy's ability to transform its broadly based cultural support into an institutionally pluralistic system of rule."

D.E.S.

QADDAFI, TERRORISM AND THE U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA. *By Brian L. Davis.* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990. 180 pages and index, \$42.95.)

A study of the United States attack against Libya in 1986 called Operation Prairie Fire, with some discussion of Libya's earlier terrorist activities.

D.E.S.

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LIBERALISM IN NORTHERN AFRICA

(Continued from page 148)

eralization in North Africa, particularly because the rulers believed that the process would not go so far or so fast as to threaten their control. What might be called "preemptive concessions," like recognizing the right of citizens to form political parties, served to take the wind out of the sails of liberal opponents of the government, as happened to the MDS in Tunisia.¹⁰

Other liberalizing measures, like lifting press censorship, allow independent intellectuals, non-government activists, academics, private entrepreneurs and labor leaders to join policy debates; such measures also identify areas where austerity measures must be implemented or where resources must be allocated. Contested elections allow governments to sound out public opinion. Insofar as new parties and political figures are elected to public office, the government may gain allies in formulating and defending new policies, or find scapegoats on whom to blame their failures. Certainly, where authoritarian governments like those in North Africa have lost touch with their own populations, liberalization is an efficient and relatively low-risk way to redevelop ties, and to find advice, information, allies and scapegoats. In other words, these reforms represent not an abstract commitment to liberal democracy, but a pragmatic concern to fend off revolution.

King Hassan was the first leader to address directly the political disaffection so evident by the mid-1980's. In August, 1984, only months after the riots, he signed a treaty with Libya that promised Moroccan access to Libyan financial resources and employment opportunities. At the time, the treaty was immensely popular in Morocco, and King

Hassan used this apparent foreign policy triumph as a backdrop to the twice-postponed parliamentary elections the following September. Thus, he created circumstances in which what were by all accounts reasonably open and fair elections could be held without risk to the regime. However, as North African specialist Mark Tessler aptly noted:

these actions did not introduce fundamental political and economic change. A small and ingrown political class remained dominant and movement toward democracy was not institutionalized and could be withdrawn at any time.¹¹

In the populist regimes of North Africa, however, the liberalization that met political crises seemed to mark a more permanent change. This did not necessarily mean that democracy was around the corner, only that the old-style authoritarianism would be tempered by greater attention to the expressed (as opposed to the assumed) aspirations of the people. Certainly for Qaddafi, and probably for the other leaders of North Africa, liberal democracy on the Western model was not the desired result of reform, at least in the short run. As one astute observer of Libya remarked,

the Colonel's apparent new willingness to compromise key elements of his strategy may be part of an attempt to strengthen his personal status and ease acceptance of the broader precepts of his revolution.¹²

This new flexibility also reflected Qaddafi's realization that all the discontent within Libya, the poor morale in the military (which had contributed to its humiliation in Chad) and the apparent growth of Islamist opposition could not be attributed to American subversion.¹³ Thus, in March, 1988, Qaddafi urged political exiles to return home and promised that they would be able to "express the opinions that they air abroad here inside the country."¹⁴ Simultaneously, he freed hundreds of political prisoners—dramatizing the policy by personally operating one of the bulldozers that opened the prison walls—and ordered the destruction of the lists of Libyans forbidden to travel abroad.

In Tunisia, Ben Ali dramatically reduced the tensions that had developed from Bourguiba's militant secularism by making a pilgrimage to Mecca shortly after taking office. He honored promises to respect human rights and the rule of law by releasing what would prove to be all the political prisoners in the country, some 3,000 people, before the end of his first year in office; he also expanded press freedoms and accorded legal recognition to a number of new parties.¹⁵ In the spring of 1989, Tunisians went to the polls for National Assembly and presidential elections. President Ben Ali ran as the presidential candidate of all the parties; his actual party, the rul-

¹⁰The party lost several leaders when Ben Ali, who had adopted most of the party platform, offered them government posts. The party suffered a crushing defeat in the spring elections.

¹¹Mark Tessler, "Explaining the Surprises of King Hassan II: The Linkage between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Morocco, Part II: The Arab-African Union Between Morocco and Libya," *UFSI Reports*, Africa/Middle East, no. 39 (1986), p. 5.

¹²Simon Ingram, "Qadhafi's New Image," *Middle East International*, no. 323 (April 16, 1988), p. 14.

¹³Indeed, one of the tactical advantages of the Islamic opposition in Libya is that it is unlikely to be seen as an agent of American imperialism. See George Joffe, "Islamic Opposition in Libya," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 2 (April, 1988); Peter Hiatt, "Libya: Fundamentalist 'Cancer,'" *Middle East International*, no. 362 (November 3, 1989).

¹⁴Quoted in "The Libyan Twilight Zone?" *Focus on Libya*, June, 1988, p. 3.

¹⁵On the reforms of Ben Ali's first year, see the special issue of *Le Maghreb*, "Bilan et Perspectives," no. 125 (November 4, 1988); François Soudan, "Ben Ali; la démocratie, c'est lui," *Jeune Afrique*, no. 1454 (November 16, 1988).

ing Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), won all the Assembly seats because of an electoral law designed to discourage the representation of minority parties. Supporters of the MTI won almost 14 percent of the vote nationally and up to 30 percent of the votes in major towns and cities, including Tunis, despite the government's refusal to legalize the party formally.

In Algeria, the first major reform after the October, 1988, riots was the issuance of a new constitution in February, 1989. This constitution guarantees basic freedoms and human rights and omits all mention of socialism and of the FLN as its vanguard; it also authorizes the creation of "associations of a political nature," thereby formally ending the era of single-party rule. In July, after months of negotiations and job actions by the country's journalists, the National Assembly issued a new information code. Although it was rejected by the journalists' association and was eventually recalled for more study, this code was a particularly important symbolic move toward greater freedom. Much to the embarrassment of the country's professional journalists, most Algerians had received news of the October riots from foreign television and radio broadcasts because the domestic news services, entirely controlled by the state and the ruling party, had been heavily censored. A new law on political parties was adopted in July and shortly thereafter new parties were authorized. Ostensibly in order to allow the new parties time to organize, planned municipal elections were postponed until 1990, and the new parties were to be permitted to present candidates only at the local level and not in the national legislative elections also scheduled for 1990.¹⁶

PROSPECTS

Few observers believe that the liberal initiatives of the mid-1980's will bring full-scale political democracy to North Africa in the short run. Both Morocco and Libya have rulers who consider themselves indispensable to the realization of national political goals; neither King Hassan nor Qaddafi is likely to allow himself to be voted out of office or retired to ceremonial duties. By contrast, the Tunisians and Algerians face a similarly daunting task of converting single-party regimes to dominant-party systems. The party elites, who have grown accustomed to holding power without accounting or competing for it, are understandably reluctant to loosen their grip and are well situated to urge policies that perpetuate their power. As critics were quick to point out, for example, both the Tunisian electoral

law and the Algerian law on political parties were drafted to consolidate the advantage of the ruling parties.

Nonetheless, there is considerable room for tempered optimism. Liberal political institutions, by their very design, are devices by which citizens place limits on the arbitrary powers of the ruler. The need to limit the powers of government often seems most urgent when the ruler's policies fail to foster and protect the material well-being of the people; when taxes grow unjustly onerous; when government consumption is too extravagant; and when services are too meager. Liberal institutions are almost always strongly resisted by rulers protective of their prerogatives and reluctant to concede rights; there is no reason to believe that North Africa will be any different. If liberal political systems are more than institutional facades, but are systems in which the majority of the people genuinely have confidence, they require—as they have in the past—long and sometimes painful political struggles, during which the rights and responsibilities of the rulers and the ruled are identified, assigned and ultimately accepted. What is cause for optimism in North Africa is not that this process has been completed, but that it has begun. ■

TURMOIL IN CHAD

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By June, in desperation, the GUNT had appealed for international help and, by the end of the year, Libya had intervened, ostensibly to preserve the GUNT as the legal government of Chad but in reality to guarantee its own control of the Aozou Strip. Soon Habré and his supporters were forced out of Chad and Libyan control over the north and the center of the country was complete. The Sara-dominated south began a separate existence under the *comité permanent*, a body controlled by former Malloumists under Abdelkader Kamougué.

Habré, however, soon rallied and, with Egyptian and Sudanese support (granted largely because of the antipathy of both countries toward the Qaddafi regime), he was able to regroup his supporters in the mountainous areas of Ennedi along Chad's frontiers with Sudan. It was here that he forged two vital links that would guarantee his final victory. Idriss Miskine joined Habré as a military adviser and brought with him the support of the Hajeray in central Chad. Ibrahim Deby, a native of the Ennedi region, brought in the Zaghawa (or Bidiyet), a tribal group that straddles the Sudanese-Chadian border and is a close neighbor of the Gorane faction of the Tibu to which Habré belongs.

As a result, when the FAN conquered N'Djamena in June, 1982, Habré found himself in charge of a cohesive tribal force that combined

¹⁶The brief "Human Rights in Algeria One Year After the Riots," issued by Africa Watch and Middle East Watch, October 4, 1989, contains balanced review of the reforms.

elements of the Gorane, the Hajeray and the Zaghawa. He also had several able lieutenants including Idriss Miskine (who died of malaria in January, 1984), Ibrahim Deby and his close relatives, Hassan Djamouss and Mahamat Itno. This group ensured that the Habré regime would extend its control southward, forcing Kamougué into exile in October, 1982, and breaking the back of the anti-northerner *codo* (*commandos rouges*) movement in 1983 and 1984.

To the north, however, the situation was far more problematic, as the Qaddafi regime first encouraged the creation of a GUNT government-in-exile in Bardai in late 1982 and then supported an invasion of northern Chad in August, 1983. It was only after French and United States intervention—in the former case with a new military force based in the southern part of the country and in the latter case with repeated supplies of military equipment—that Habré's forces under the field command of Hassan Djamouss were eventually able to force the Libyan-backed rebel forces to the international border region in 1987. More direct military aid was also provided in 1987 by Iraq, which has its own reasons for supporting anti-Qaddafi movements in Africa.¹²

Despite its military success, however, the Habré regime could not maintain itself merely through a tribal coalition based on the three pillars of the Gorane, Hajeray and Zaghawa. Indeed, by 1984 it was evident that tensions were developing among them. For the Hajeray, for example, Idriss Miskine's unexpected death had more sinister implications for a power struggle within the regime that their patron had lost. Habré also had to placate southern opponents and it was clear that the only way to suppress the northern rebellion would be to win rebel leaders over to the regime—an activity in which Mahamat Itno eventually was to excel. The dominant role of northerners would have to be suppressed.

In 1984, Habré created the UNIR as a new vehicle around which national unity could coalesce, and by 1988, the UNIR had absorbed a whole series of former opponents.¹³ Itno was unable to persuade Goukouni Oueddai to return because of differences over the proposed constitution for Chad. Instead, Oueddai remained sulking in his Algerian tent. But he had been instrumental in the collapse of the Libyan-backed rebel forces, declaring his support for the Habré regime in October, 1986, largely because of a disagreement with Qaddafi.

However, Itno persuaded Goukouni Oueddai's chief rival, Acheikhu Ibn Omar, the leader of the ostensibly pro-Libyan Conseil Démocratique pour la Révolution (CDR), to return in November, 1988. Acheikhu joined other former GUNT stalwarts, like Abdelkader Kaimougué and former *codo* leaders like Kotiga Guerina and Ngarnayal Mbailemdana, in taking a ministerial post. He became foreign minister, an excellent advertisement for the apparently successful policy of reconciliation followed by the Habré regime.

In fact, the reconciliation policy has turned out to be at considerable odds with the continuing realities of political power in N'Djamena, which still depend on competition between different military patrons and their many clients. The introduction of former rebel leaders and their supporters into the administration has caused considerable disaffection within the northern tribal power base of the Habré regime. Many former rebel supporters believe that they have been abandoned by their former patrons. Disputes within the regime have also resulted in the progressive disaffection of two of the three tribal groups on which Habré depended, the Hajeray and the Zaghawa.

The Hajeray have reacted strongly against resentments voiced by the Gorane since 1984. Furthermore, the disappearance of Idriss Miskine deprived them of a vital patron. Then, between December, 1986, and June, 1988, the situation was inflamed by the arrest of four leading Hajeray in senior ministerial and administrative positions. In June, 1987, a rebellion broke out in the Hajeray homeland in Guera, led by a new movement, Le Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad (Monsanat). The rebellion has rumbled on and, although it is isolated from the center of power, it has provided a new focus for discontent with the Gorane-dominated Habré regime.

A far more serious incident occurred in April, 1989: an attempted coup against the Habré regime by three of its leading Zaghawa members—Ibrahim Daby, Hassan Djamouss and Mahamat Itno.

Although the regime survived the attempt, the damage to its prestige and stability has been considerable. Hassan Djamouss attempted to flee to Guera but was killed. Mahamat Itno was arrested and disappeared. Ibrahim Deby, the former military coordinator of the FAN in 1982 and responsible for relations with the Libyan opposition to the Qaddafi regime since 1987, fled to Tripoli. He has now begun to organize a new rebel movement against the Habré regime.¹⁴

The new movement—which Habré claims is merely a Libyan force trying to camouflage itself as a Chadian dissident movement—is now operating along the Chadian-Sudanese border and has suc-

¹²See Kay Whiteman, op. cit.

¹³A complete list is given in Anonymous, "Chad: Habré at the Turning Point," *Africa Confidential*, vol. 30, no. 9 (April 28, 1989).

¹⁴Ibid.

cessfully resisted at least one Chadian government attack. It undoubtedly has considerable Libyan backing, for Colonel Qaddafi (despite his agreement on August 31, 1989, to allow the International Court of Justice at The Hague to decide Libya's dispute with Chad over the Aozou Strip) is most unlikely to miss an opportunity to embarrass the Chadian government. However, the movement also reflects considerable tribal resentment at the behavior of the Habré regime and at the consequences of its policy of reconciliation.

THE FUTURE

At the same time, the Habré government can claim that its de facto recognition by the OAU and the United Nations—and by most countries in Europe and Africa—has led to de jure status as a result of the referendum. It seems unlikely that the new rebellion along the border with Sudan can threaten the regime, despite Libyan support and Sudanese complaisance. Yet it highlights a major problem for the regime, which still depends on the support of the Gorane despite all the claims of reconciliation and of a new national spirit.

As the correspondent of *Le Monde* noted during a recent visit to N'Djamena, Habré's Gorane supporters control the capital, despite lip service paid to the UNIR as the vehicle of political consensus and control. They are also feared and hated by the people, who refer to them as "unruly Dobermans."¹⁵ Indeed, the events of the past three years have left the Gorane once again the undisputed masters of military power in Chad. They have definitively reversed the post-colonial balance of power by ensuring that, as in pre-colonial times, the north once again controls the destiny of the south of Chad.

The consequent political isolation of the Gorane means that the complex formal structure of the UNIR and government as instruments of reconciliation could soon be shattered. In the last analysis, President Hissène Habré of Chad depended on his own clients and on his ability to satisfy other powerful patrons to guarantee his political survival. Yet to win the peace, he will have to escape their embrace and build on the formal political structures he has created. It is not yet clear that he will be able to do so successfully. ■

¹⁵*Le Monde*, December 9, 1989.

LIBYA

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seemed pleased with their discussions and agreed to open "bureaus" in Tripoli and Cairo. This is the closest equivalent to reopening embassies in the two capitals without resuming formal relations.

A joint communiqué was issued on the Libyan-Egyptian talks. The two sides agreed to facilitate the

movement of people between the two countries, to build a railway linking al-Sallum in Egypt with Tobruk in Libya, and to improve navigation and road links and facilitate the flow of information between Libya and Egypt. They also decided to encourage trade and financial exchanges, agricultural cooperation, the setting up of joint companies for oil exploration and production, and marine fishing. Labor agreements were also reached.²⁶

This may have been the most important foreign policy decision that Qaddafi has made in more than a decade. Resuming relations with Egypt means that Qaddafi has returned to the Arab fold and has undertaken to follow a more moderate course in foreign policy vis-à-vis the Arab world. Having long criticized Egypt for its peace treaty with Israel, Libya seems finally to have accepted the fact of Israel's existence, and has undertaken to ignore it.

With improved relations with Egypt, Libya is again the link between the Maghreb and the Arab states to the east of Libya. As a member of the Arab Maghrebi Union, Libya became strategically important for Egypt, which did not want to become isolated in North Africa. The tug-of-war between Maghrebi countries and Egypt over Libya has resumed once more, endowing Libya and its leader with more regional importance than they have enjoyed in years.

In October, 1988, in a speech to the World Affairs Council in Washington, D.C., William H. Webster, director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), disclosed that Libya was developing a large chemical plant in Rabta, 40 miles south of Tripoli, that could be used for chemical warfare. In April, 1989, the press revealed that Libya had purchased 15 supersonic Sukhoi-24D bombers, with an alleged radius of 800 miles; and that it had reached an agreement with the Soviet Union to refit a Soviet Ilyushin-76, a transport plane purchased earlier by Libya, to enable it to refuel the Sukhoi-24D in mid-air, thus increasing its radius by 50 percent. Webster described these developments as threatening stability in the Middle East and extending Libya's war capabilities as far north as West Europe.

Qualitative and quantitative changes in the pattern of arms procurement in Libya reflect major changes in the political environment of the region. When Qaddafi feels threatened by these changes he increases and diversifies Libya's arms purchases.²⁷ Thus the United States bombing of Libya in April, 1986, and the inability or unwillingness of the

²⁶See text of joint Egyptian-Libyan communiqué, in FBIS, October 18, 1989, p. 16.

²⁷See the author's unpublished paper, "Foreign Policy Implications of Libya's Acquisition of Missiles and Chemical Weapons," presented at a seminar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Boston, April, 1989.

Soviet Union to defend or even forewarn the Libyans led Qaddafi to reassess Libya's national security arrangements. His new policy focused on acquiring more and better weapons and pacifying the United States.

In the wake of the United States raid of April, 1986, Qaddafi began to expand and diversify Libya's arsenal. He stated that Libya's oil and iron and steel industries ought to be

complemented by strategic industries for defense against the Israelis, against the Americans and against Europe if it is an aggressor. Had you had missiles capable of striking U.S. bases in Sicily, they would not have attacked you.²⁸

Those weapons, therefore, were perceived primarily as a deterrent against external threats to Libya.

Less than a year after the United States raid, Libya's southern borders were threatened when Chadians with French logistic support reached inside Libya's territory and inflicted serious damage on its military infrastructure. This defeat may have been a determining factor in Qaddafi's desire to develop chemical weapons. The use of such weapons by Iraq, in its war with Iran, did not go unnoticed in Libya and it is not inconceivable that chemical weapons may be used in future conflict with Chad. In other words, the acquisition of chemical weapons may not be only for deterrent purposes.

Qaddafi's pragmatic reaction to the United States raid and the Chadian incursion was to increase Libya's arsenal of weapons while simultaneously adopting a conciliatory policy toward those two countries. In May, 1988, he announced an end to the conflict with Chad and the recognition of its government, and in October of that year diplomatic relations were restored between Tripoli and N'Djamena.

Qaddafi made a number of attempts to improve United States-Libyan relations. In September, 1988, he suggested in an interview that relations between the two countries would improve only after the United States elections, because President Ronald Reagan had something against him personally. Despite the shooting down of a Libyan aircraft by two United States fighter planes in January, 1989, Qaddafi continued to try to improve relations through negotiations over the frozen assets of five United States oil companies in Libya. Reuters news service quoted sources in Tripoli saying that Libya wanted an end to the United States boycott of oil exports and the return of United States personnel to Libya to run their companies.²⁹ On January 13, 1989, Libya returned to Vatican representatives the

body of a United States serviceman shot down during the United States raid in April, 1986. Later that month in a press interview, Qaddafi said he was willing to hold official talks with President George Bush's administration about United States-Libyan relations, and to work for the release of United States hostages in Lebanon.³⁰ Finally, Libyan Foreign Minister Jadallah Azzuz Talhi was quoted in an Abu Dhabi-based daily as saying, "Libya wants normal ties with the United States based on mutual respect and without conditions from the American side."³¹

CONCLUSION

Libya has embarked on a more moderate course both domestically and in its foreign relations. The changes, however, do not reflect a new spirit of reform because the fundamental principles on which the state is built have not changed significantly. They reflect Qaddafi's pragmatic attitude toward politics: do what is necessary to remain in power and to protect Libya's independence.

Although there may be greater liberalization of the economy in the months to come, there is little hope for political changes of any substance. After the initial euphoria over new economic freedom subsidies, the realization of the limits of change will lead to more opposition to the regime. The Islamic fundamentalists in Libya, as in other parts of North Africa, will constitute the most powerful mobilizing force against the Qaddafi regime.

The Libyan leader will continue to pursue a more moderate course in foreign affairs, without breaking his ties with old allies. Although a member of the Arab Maghrebi Union, he will maintain close ties with Egypt and will try to play a balancing game between the states of North Africa. He has already restored relations with Iraq, but maintains good relations with Iran and has improved his relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization without breaking his links with dissident Palestinian groups.

Internationally, he will try to improve his image in the West and look for closer ties with the United States, becoming less involved in support for terrorist groups and organizations worldwide. He will remain dependent on the Soviet Union for military aid and on the Eastern bloc nations for trade. Since little more should be expected domestically, Qaddafi's major political moves will be on the international stage. ■

SUDAN

(Continued from page 156)

resolve Sudanese problems rapidly through managerial skills. Since one of the most important problems is resolving the civil war and coming to terms

²⁸FBIS, October 3, 1989, p. 25.

²⁹*Middle East Economic Digest*, June 23, 1989, p. 18.

³⁰KCA, vol. 35, no. 3 (March, 1989), p. 36572.

³¹FBIS, October 11, 1989, p. 15.

with the SPLM, this may be very difficult. The SPLM insists on a commitment to a secular state in a peace settlement, and this is one premise that the Brotherhood will not accept. The ideology of the regime and its managerial needs may be in conflict, thus weakening the position of Bashir and his colleagues.

CURRENT CRISIS

At the beginning of the 1990's, Sudan is in a time of crisis. In the past, there has been an alternation between civilian and military regimes as leaders have tried and failed to resolve past crises. At each change of regime, there has been a surge of optimism as a new set of leaders takes control. However, because of the repeated failures of both civilian and military leaders, there was little hope expressed when Bashir and his colleagues took control in the summer of 1989. Many observers regarded the latest change of regime as the repetition of an old scenario.

The situation in Sudan is one of multiple, interacting crises. The heritage of ineffective rule, both civilian and military, is frightening. The issue may in fact have changed from who will rule Sudan to whether or not Sudan will be able to survive in any meaningful fashion. The prospect is that thousands may die as a result of famine intensified by the continuing civil war; and increasing numbers will be killed in the fighting. Institutions of government and central control have decreasing effectiveness. The military coup in the summer of 1989 took place in this context but apparently did not represent a significantly new approach.

The Bashir government's program opened the door to significant discussions with the SPLM. Basic points of agreement included the necessity to freeze the implementation of Islamic law, the initiation of a cease-fire and the convening of a national constitutional convention in September, 1989. On the basis of this program, the SPLM announced a cease-fire and its willingness to participate in the national convention. Most important, Bashir announced that the implementation of Islamic law would be submitted to a national referendum rather than a national convention. The SPLM argued that the northern majority would not vote against its religion; the new position was unacceptable to the SPLM.

The Bashir government was not able to call together a national convention that included the SPLM, but it unilaterally organized a national dialogue conference in October. This conference

heard many different speakers and produced a report that recommended the establishment of a "federal system" of government for Sudan, with a nationally elected President and Vice President. The conference report specified that there could be no compulsion in matters of religion, but that "Muslims had the right to follow the tenets of their religion in the various areas of life without depriving others of their rights."⁷

The major area of disagreement in principle between the SPLM and the Bashir regime was the role of Islamic law. At the end of 1989, former United States President Jimmy Carter (an impartial mediator) persuaded representatives from the Bashir regime and the SPLM to meet for negotiations in Nairobi, Kenya. Although Carter had made some significant progress in peace talks regarding the civil conflict in Ethiopia, he was forced to conclude that in the Sudanese talks, "neither side came to Nairobi prepared to take the difficult steps necessary for peace"; and the talks broke down mainly over the issue of Islamic law.⁸

The SPLM program called for the creation of a broad-based government of national unity that would be formed by the two military groups and the "nonsectarian political parties." It also called for the creation of a new national army including both the army of "the old Sudan" and the SPLA and for the convening of a national constitutional conference. This would have excluded all the Islamic political groups, including the old major parties and the NIF.⁹ Attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had broken down by the beginning of 1990. Fighting resumed in many regions, and few observers were able to predict an early resolution of the conflict.

The Bashir regime also faced major economic problems. Sudan had a large foreign debt and a significant balance of payments deficit. However, in the context of continued civil war, little could be done to develop new approaches to increase productivity. The transportation network needed significant repair; and other difficulties with the basic infrastructure hindered government efforts to improve the economic situation. The military regime, however, also showed the limitations characteristic of previous Sudanese military leaders in dealing with economic issues. Authoritarian methods of control were adopted. For example, the major government initiative in dealing with the weakness of Sudanese currency was to require the reporting of foreign currency holdings and to make the non-reporting of such holdings a capital offense. A member of a prominent family was executed in December, 1989, for illegally possessing foreign currency.

One of the most troubling reflections of the

⁷FBIS, 89-204, October 24, 1989.

⁸*The New York Times*, December 6, 1989.

⁹FBIS, 89-191, October 4, 1989.

government's decreasing ability to provide stability is the increasing availability of arms in areas outside the southern war zone. Earlier governments had given encouragement to the creation of local militias that became well-armed bands drawn from various rural ethnic groups. Such militias continued older traditions of intergroup conflict and cattle raids, but used the increased firepower of automatic weapons. At the beginning of 1990, this trend had been strengthened, and massacres of hundreds of villagers in western Sudan had been reported. This poses the threat of growing anarchy in the countryside and reveals the increasing inability of the country's rulers to maintain minimum security.

At the beginning of the parliamentary era of the 1980's it was possible to state that the "civilian leaders will have to be more cooperative than they have been in the past if the old cycle is not to be repeated."¹⁰ The old cycle has repeated itself and a new military regime is in power. The military leaders of Sudan will have to be more flexible so that Sudan will not repeat the old cycle again or descend into anarchy. ■

¹⁰John O. Voll, "The Sudan After Nimeiry," *Current History*, vol. 85, no. 511 (May, 1986), p. 232.

ALGERIA

(Continued from page 164)

long-time fixtures, like Taleb Ibrahim as foreign minister and Belkacem Nabi as energy minister (not to mention Merbah's predecessor Abdelhamid Brahimi) all left the government. The Merbah government had a look of sufficient freshness to satisfy the popular expectations of change, but it nevertheless had something of the character of a caretaker government pending the sixth party congress and the presidential election scheduled for the end of 1988. The internal divisions within the elite had to be addressed at the FLN gathering.

The convention was, as an Algerian official put it, "an ordinary congress being held in extraordinary circumstances."¹⁰ In effect, the President was going to the party to ask it to approve the very reforms that would narrow its role in the Algerian political system. Many of the same forces that had resisted the rewriting of the National Charter now

¹⁰*Le Monde*, November 27-28, 1988.

¹¹*Ibid.*, November 29, 1988.

¹²Shortly before the convention, Bendjedid appointed General Khaled Nezzar, who had been commander of the army, as the new chief of staff of the armed forces while retaining the services of General Belhouichet as "presidential adviser for military affairs."

¹³*Le Monde*, February 7, 1989.

¹⁴The text may be found in *Les Cahiers de l'Orient*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1989), pp. 170-187.

stood against the drift of Bendjedid's proposals for institutional reform. Indeed, even before the party convention, Prime Minister Merbah had run into a similar roadblock when he presented his government program to the FLN-controlled National Assembly; a bloc of deputies withheld approval for more than a week before finally voting for the necessary resolution.

In outlining his reforms before the delegates, Bendjedid declared that "the convention is free to accept or reject them, but we must evolve in our ideas and our methods to remain relevant to societal changes."¹¹ Although it was clear that there was opposition in the local party cells, there was no clear alternative leadership, especially insofar as Bendjedid had been careful to line up the support of the large bloc of delegates from the military.¹² Thus the party officially gave its blessing to the presidential program and renominated him for a third term.

No sooner was the election behind him than the President pushed ahead with even more substantial changes. Addressing the prefectural corps in mid-January, 1989, Bendjedid asserted that the constitution of 1976 was flawed by its ideological character. Boumedienne's constitution, he argued, was more like a political program than a genuine constitutional text. The constitution of 1989, he promised, would remedy these defects by instituting a genuine "state of law."¹³

When the new draft was made public in early February, Algerians found that it made no reference to the charter, to socialism or, for that matter, to the FLN (other than a historical allusion in the preamble). Moreover, Article 40 of the new document stipulated that "The right to create associations of a political character is recognized."¹⁴ Whereas Article 1 of the old constitution stated that "the Algerian state is socialist" and Article 28 spelled out the state's objective as "the radical transformation of society based on principles of socialist organization," the new text declared that "the state is founded on principles of democratic organization and social justice."

Publication of the draft constitution made it evident that Bendjedid's "state of law" entailed a far more liberal concept of state-society relations than has heretofore prevailed in Algeria. The President was using the 1988 crisis to carry forward (and perhaps further) the changes that he had sought without success at the time of the charter revision episode. The 1989 constitution, duly approved by national referendum on February 23, gave him some freedom from ideological constraints. At the same time, it opened Algerian politics in dramatic fashion.

Even before the formal adoption of the new constitutional order, long-repressed social forces began

to organize "associations of a political character." One of the first to take form was the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), which was a reincarnation of the semi-clandestine Berber Cultural Movement. Formed in Tizi-Ouzou, the major city in the Kabyle mountains and the stronghold of the Algerian Berber population, the RCD was designed to defend Berber cultural and political interests. Its general secretary was Said Sadi, a psychiatrist who had also been active in the Algerian human rights movement. Because Berber activism had long been a major source of friction in the political system, acceptance of the new political organization was an important sign of a more tolerant political climate.

Other groups sprang up quickly. Within a few months, five small parties, some led by familiar figures like Ahmed Mahsas, a minister under Ahmed Ben Bella and Boumedienne, and others by little-known regional figures, had even formed a coalition. The Socialist Vanguard party (PAGS), which had operated underground since the Algerian Communist party was banned in the early 1960's, resurfaced, urging its supporters to vote for the new constitution.

One of the most significant forces to emerge was the Islamic Safeguard Front (FIS), with Abbas Madani at its head. Madani, arrested for planting a bomb during the Algerian war, has a degree in philosophy and a university post; in 1982, he had been arrested again, this time for fundamentalist agitation. Now he is the leader of a rapidly growing party that has won a considerable following not only by criticizing the secular regime but by its social welfare activities.

After the November, 1989, earthquake, for example, FIS emergency assistance units were often the first to bring aid to the victims. The organization has opened its own medical clinics, and sometimes it distributes water free to neighborhoods where the government is rationing the supply (for years, Algiers has been plagued by an inadequate water supply). As the first officially recognized fundamentalist party in the Maghreb, the FIS may well pose a serious challenge to the elite.

Not only have political organizations proliferated since February, 1989, but they have been accorded legal means to get their messages out. Although parties must file for official recognition, the government granted 14 approvals by December, 1989. The parties are authorized by law to publish their own newspapers on condition that their primary publication be in Arabic. Party leaders have been given some access to the airwaves as well; indeed, one of the most popular radio programs is a political talk show inaugurated in 1989 called "Transparences"—

the closest thing to glasnost that Algeria has seen. The emergence of parties other than the FLN and the relatively greater openness of the media have created a new tone for public life in Algeria, but critical components are missing.

So far there have been no elections to test the new rules, although local elections are scheduled for 1990. Moreover, despite greater freedom of expression, key decisions are made behind a screen of obscurity. Factions within the ruling coalition—elements of the army, the party, the Cabinet, the presidency—struggle for control without much public debate. During the summer of 1989, the general public was vaguely aware that differences had risen between Merbah and Bendjedid. Merbah wanted to focus on pragmatic economic reform while going slow on ideological change and political liberalization; Bendjedid apparently preferred to unleash new political currents in order to shake up the entrenched elements of the FLN. Merbah used his government authority to squelch an article critical of his policies by Kamel Belkacem, generally considered Bendjedid's spokesman. No public reason was offered for the dismissal of the editor of *Révolution Africaine* after he wrote an article critical of the Baathist or pan-Arabist group within the party. These indications of tensions within the governing group were confirmed when the President abruptly dismissed Merbah in September.

The new Prime Minister was Mouloud Hamrouche, one of Bendjedid's most trusted collaborators and secretary general of the presidential office since 1986. Hamrouche was, like Bendjedid, a military man from the east (a Constantinois), who had long served on the presidential staff. He proved, however, to be the only person of military background in the largely technocratic government. Hamrouche ambitiously predicted that "my program is going to make all of Algerian society tip from one system to another."¹⁵ Speaking to the National Assembly, he criticized the Merbah government for failing to carry out comprehensive reforms. The appointment of Hamrouche put the presidential circle in control of government policy. Moreover, the fact that the military did not budge when Merbah briefly disputed Bendjedid's authority to dismiss him indicated that the army was firmly behind the President.

Yet Bendjedid has not fully mastered the situation within the FLN, which is still the ruling party because new elections have not yet been called. At the end of November, 1989, the party met in extraordinary session to reassess its position a year after the session at which it put forward its reformer-leader to serve a third term. The convention was essentially an opportunity to establish whether the FLN had achieved a new consensus behind Ben-

¹⁵*Le Monde*, October 5, 1989.

djedid. The meeting was preceded by 14 regional party caucuses at which presidential reformers tried to constitute a majority favorable to the Bendjedid-Hamrouche platform. The strategy, according to journalist Frédéric Fritscher, was to "play the grass roots off against the apparatchiks."¹⁶

Once again, as in the earlier tactic of revising the national charter, Bendjedid was not entirely successful. The FLN remained an amalgam of competing tendencies—liberals, orthodox socialists, pluralists, Islamists (one delegation called for the application of sharia, or Islamic law, another called for abolishing coeducational schools). The delegates insisted, among other decisions, on restoring some of the old Boumediennist leadership (men like Salah Yahiaoui, Belaid Abdesselam, Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Cherif Messaadia) to the central committee. The session revealed that Bendjedid had not refashioned the party in his own image; whether the FLN of 1990 can compete successfully with the new social forces unleashed by the October, 1988, events or by Bendjedid's own reformist impulses is far from obvious.

It is clear, however, that the Algeria of the 1990's will be subject to further strains—emanating from the post-independence generation, the difficult economic conjuncture and the competing visions of society that jostle one another in this Mediterranean Arab state. One of Bendjedid's major initiatives during the 1980's, the construction of a "Greater Maghreb," was a foreign policy response to the whole issue of Algeria's future.¹⁷ The creation of the Arab Maghrebi Union (UMA), a political-economic association with Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, achieved some of Bendjedid's objectives. But the UMA may well be stalling and in any case is not a panacea for the challenges of the coming decade. Bendjedid and his circle must continue to strive for the formula that will assure the legitimacy of the state erected on the foundation of the Algerian revolution. ■

¹⁶Ibid., November 30, 1989.

¹⁷For an analysis of this initiative, see Robert Mortimer, "Maghreb Matters," *Foreign Policy*, no. 76 (Fall, 1989), pp. 160-175.

TUNISIA

(Continued from page 172)

past. The Communist party was not given legal status until April, 1981, and the MDS and PUP did not receive recognition until November, 1983.¹³

Municipal by-elections in December, 1987, and

¹³For details see Mark Tessler, "Tunisia at the Crossroads," *Current History*, May, 1985, p. 219.

¹⁴Dirk Vandewalle, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 42 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 614-615.

legislative by-elections in January, 1988, offered an early test of the prospects for Ben Ali's program. Tunisian officials argued that the balloting had been conducted with minimal interference, but this was not completely accurate. An independent slate composed of breakaway PSD members won one of the municipal contests, in Ksar Hillal; and to make sure this did not happen in any of the four constituencies where legislative by-elections were being held, the PSD's political machine intervened. Even so, independent candidates did well in some areas, most notably in Gafsa, where the PSD candidate received only two-thirds of the votes cast.

Adding to concern was low voter turnout, with only 56 percent of the eligible voters going to the polls in Tunis, for example, and the PUP and MDS refusing to take part in the elections, calling instead for early general elections. Even more important, the faction best able to offer voters a serious alternative to the ruling party, the MTI, continued to be denied recognition as a political party and could participate in the elections only if its supporters ran as independents.

Aware that democratization required the cooperation of the PSD, Ben Ali called for an overhaul of the party.¹⁴ The President's goal was to introduce into the ruling party the same reformist spirit he sought to bring to the political system as a whole. In response, the party changed its name in February, 1988. Henceforth it would be known as the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). Organizational changes included an attempt to rejuvenate the party's three-tiered structure of local branches, regional coordinating committees and a central committee at the national level. Ben Ali declared that "there is no longer any place in the party for opportunists." The RCD was to be led by "honest militants" dedicated to serving their country and their fellow citizens.

Ben Ali shuffled the RCD central committee at a special party convention in July, 1988. His goal was to remove old-time leaders who opposed his reforms and were associated with the lethargy and privilege that the PSD had come to symbolize. These and other changes brought many new and younger individuals into positions of prominence. RCD officials announced that the number of dues-paying members had grown to nearly 1.5 million, an all-time record, and that the average age of party members was now about 35.

At the same time, there was considerable resistance within the party to efforts at democratization. Opposition remained strong among some members of the National Assembly, a number of influential governors, and some RCD leaders at the regional and local level.

In September, 1988, two new opposition parties

were granted legal status. One, the Socialist Progressive Rally, is a leftist party ideologically akin to the PUP. The other, the Social Party for Progress, describes itself as liberal. This brought to five the number of small, left-of-center parties standing in opposition to the RCD.

The elections of April, 1989, offered Tunisians an opportunity to gauge the character of the political system emerging under Ben Ali and to determine how much, or how little, things had changed. In the presidential elections, Ben Ali, who ran as an all-parties candidate, was unopposed and received an overwhelming mandate. Ninety-nine percent of those who voted gave him their support. Although there had not been a choice, there is little doubt that most Tunisians supported the new President.

The legislative elections were contested, however, and, perhaps predictably, they offered both satisfaction and disappointment to those advocating a dramatic break with the past. Advocates of democratization were heartened by their competitive nature, and the government insisted that the elections had been largely free of interference. On the other hand, while abuses were indeed limited in comparison to the elections of the recent past, opposition candidates alleged serious violations in favor of the RCD, including charges that opposition party lists were illegally invalidated in some areas and that voters were intimidated at some polling stations. Also disappointing was the turnout; of 4 million potential voters, only 2.7 million registered and only 2.1 million went to the polls.

The most serious limitations were a refusal to authorize participation by the Islamist party and a winner-take-all electoral system that prevented non-RCD candidates from translating votes into parliamentary seats. The Islamic Tendency Movement had formed the Renaissance party in order to participate in the political process, choosing this designation in light of a ban on the term "Islam" in party names. But the party was nevertheless denied recognition and Islamist candidates were required to run as independents. Concerning electoral laws, ballots were cast for party lists, rather than individual candidates, in districts the size of states. Thus, despite the theoretical possibility of crossover voting, it was almost impossible for a minor party to win seats in the National Assembly. In contrast to a system of proportional representation, the party whose list received the most votes in a district won all that district's seats in Parliament.

The result was that the RCD captured all 141 Assembly seats, a victory that pleased party regulars but raised questions about progress toward Ben Ali's goal of democratization. Further, the most important of the legal opposition parties, the MDS, received only 3.8 percent of the vote, suggesting

that parties of the left did not offer voters a meaningful alternative. The relative success of Renaissance party candidates running as independents is consistent with this analysis. They captured 14.5 percent of all votes cast, and, according to official figures, won up to one-third in cities like Tunis, Sousse and Gabes. Islamists themselves put the figures even higher, insisting that they won a majority in some districts and that only fraud prevented them from obtaining seats in Parliament.

The results of the election, like efforts to reform the RCD, suggest that the path leading Tunisia toward greater democracy is beset with obstacles. While significant progress was made during Ben Ali's first two years in office, movement was not so rapid as the President and many other Tunisians had hoped.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Tunisia will have to deal successfully with several interrelated challenges if it is to make further progress toward democratization. On the one hand, Ben Ali will have to introduce additional reforms within the ranks of the RCD, either replacing more old-time party stalwarts or persuading those individuals to accept meaningful political competition. Democratization of the RCD is probably a precondition for democratization of the political system as a whole. Yet, despite the reforms already introduced into its ranks, the party is resisting changes that might require it to share power.

A related consideration is the need for electoral reform. Whether based on proportional representation, the abolition of party lists or an increase in the number of districts, democratization requires a departure from the winner-take-all voting system that prohibited opposition parties from capturing any seats in the 1989 legislative elections. In this area, too, resistance from those with a stake in the existing order will have to be overcome.

On the other hand, even if resistance from the RCD can be diminished, there is a need to identify legitimate alternatives that can be presented to the voters. A viable opposition, as well as a tolerant government, is a prerequisite for democracy. Yet the 1989 elections strongly suggest that parties of the left are unable to play this role. These parties do not appear to have a significant constituency. Their platforms have little appeal, especially when enthusiasm for socialism is diminishing in so many countries. Further, the leaders of some opposition parties, most notably the MDS, are former allies of Bourguiba's who left the ruling party when it lost its early dynamism. Though their liberal credentials are respectable, these movements represent the past and offer voters little that they cannot find in greater measure in a revitalized RCD led by Ben Ali.

Whatever the degree of interference in the elections of April, 1989, this is probably the principal reason that opposition parties attracted so little support.

The major available alternative is the Renaissance party, and establishing a satisfactory relationship between the Islamists and the state is another challenge facing Ben Ali. Indeed, at present, it may be his greatest challenge. Tunisians are divided about how to deal with the Islamists. Some, accepting the assurances of Renaissance party leaders that they seek to work within the political system, favor legalizing the party. These individuals reason that the severity of the Islamists' opposition will diminish if they are given a stake in the existing order. Those taking this position also believe that the Islamists' appeal will be reduced if they are seen as part of the political system and are forced to share responsibility for the country's problems. Indeed, it is pointed out that many who voted for Islamist candidates in April, 1989, were probably endorsing the idea of political competition as much or even more than the Renaissance party's platform.

Yet other Tunisians, including many within the RCD, insist that the Islamist movement is fundamentally anti-democratic and will use any opportunity it receives to undermine the institutions of the modern state. Sharing the view of Bourguiba, these Tunisians reject Ghannouchi's argument that radicalism is not inherent in the Islamist movement but, rather, is the product of government repression. Thus, whatever their views about the best way to contain the movement, they believe that legalizing the Renaissance party would be a grave mistake. Thus far, Ben Ali has taken this view.

If the Islamist movement does gain official acceptance, events will show which of these two assessments is correct. If it is not accepted (which seems more likely), the country will face an important contradiction in its quest for democracy, banning the only opposition party with significant popular support. In addition, under these circumstances, the Islamist movement will undoubtedly continue to challenge the regime, and there may be another confrontation of the kind that provided the catalyst for Ben Ali's takeover.

Finally, this will be played out against a background of economic uncertainty. While gains in tourism and a good harvest brightened the economic picture in 1988, there are important economic problems on both the long-term and the short-term horizons. Chronic unemployment, fueled by rapid population growth, is likely to remain a source of tension; and the problem will worsen to the extent that developments in Europe make France and other countries less open to migrant labor from North Africa. In the meantime, inadequate rainfall for the second year in a row has devastated the 1989

harvest, and austerity measures, mandated by Tunisia's international creditors, will further intensify the economic pressure on the average Tunisian. One aspect of the country's austerity program is a reduction in government subsidies on basic foodstuffs and other products. Austerity and economic adjustment may lead to development and growth in the long run, but in the near term they will create dislocations and intensify the pressure on the Ben Ali government.

While most Tunisians give high marks to their new President, performance as well as good intentions will become increasingly important in the months ahead. The honesty and dedication of Bourguiba's successor have brightened the mood in Tunisia and, from its starting point in late 1987, the country has made significant progress in its quest for democratization. Yet there are formidable obstacles to further progress, suggesting that Tunisia's political future may be less certain. The legislative elections of 1989 highlighted many of these obstacles and appear to have ended the first phase of Tunisia's transition to democracy. It remains to be seen whether the Ben Ali regime can build on the momentum generated thus far or whether Tunisia will gradually slide backward, in the direction of lethargy, confrontation and popular discontent. ■

MOROCCO

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longer term, to achieve a lasting settlement—a formula must be found that is acceptable to both Morocco and Algeria, the two key players in the Sahara conflict. In essence, such a formula must accommodate Morocco's deeply held desire to incorporate the Sahara while at the same time allowing Algeria some face-saving retreat from its long-time support of, and international association with, the Polisario Front and the SADR.

The most promising way to satisfy both Moroccan and Algerian interests would appear to be a settlement involving some form of Saharan autonomy. This approach would allow Morocco to claim ultimate sovereignty over the Sahara and to retain responsibility for the territory's defense and foreign relations. Saharan autonomy would also allow the Polisario and its supporters to participate in the political, administrative and economic life of the Western Sahara. By forswearing armed struggle, the Polisario could hope to dominate other aspects of the Sahara within a decentralized Moroccan state. Only time and Moroccan policy implementation would tell how meaningful a role the Polisario would be allowed to play. The autonomy approach is consistent with current Moroccan plans for administrative decentralization, which involve

the creation of nine administrative regions, including one that covers the Western Sahara, to be organized along the lines of the West German *länder* system. Each new region would have a democratically elected regional assembly and specific economic responsibilities.

If Algeria proves willing to reach an agreement with Morocco for a settlement of the Sahara conflict on terms unacceptable to the Polisario leadership, can the front undermine or delay a settlement? With little direct leverage to exert on Algeria, the Polisario would be poorly placed to oppose a settlement reached over its head by Morocco and Algeria. The Polisario could refuse the terms of a referendum agreed to by Morocco and Algeria; then, depending on the position taken by the UN special representative, the Polisario could risk being left out of a referendum. Since the referendum would be administered by the UN, the Polisario would be in a weak position diplomatically if it rejected its outcome.

It is more likely that a Polisario refusal would delay the organization of a referendum. In this case, Algeria could be expected to cut off military supplies, though not humanitarian assistance. With considerable stocks of military supplies, the Polisario could continue to launch attacks along the Moroccan Great Wall for some time—perhaps for as long as three years. Morocco would be able to contain these attacks within acceptable limits, so that a *de facto* settlement could occur.

With its military supplies exhausted, the Polisario would be reduced to the plight of a powerless refugee movement. An unknown factor is Algeria's willingness to move quickly to restrict or eliminate Polisario operations from its territory. If the Polisario then shifted its base of operations to Mauritania, the movement would be vulnerable to Moroccan air power—assuming that Algeria would no longer provide a protective shield.

On the diplomatic level, if the Polisario lacked Algerian support, it would lose much of its visibility. Without Algerian passports and travel funds, Polisario leaders would also lose their mobility.

The Polisario launched a series of attacks against the Moroccan Great Wall during October and November, 1989, ending the unilateral truce that it had declared the previous January. The inconclusive military impact of this offensive is less significant than the setback it entailed for a political settlement.

It is possible that the fall offensive was mounted without Chadli Bendjedid's approval. According to one explanation, which the Moroccan government

preferred to accept, a hardline FLN faction opposed to both Bendjedid's internal liberalization and the rapprochement with Morocco encouraged the Polisario attacks. This FLN faction had ties to the Algerian Army, whose sympathizers allowed supplies to reach the Polisario and did not interfere with its military operations.

This helps explain how the Polisario could mount a strong offensive when other indications suggest its strength is in serious decline. There is good reason to believe that Algeria has cut back its material support for the Polisario. Food is said to be in short supply in the Polisario's 25 refugee camps in southwest Algeria, where living standards have declined. Another indication of the front's falling morale and internal disunity surfaced during 1989, when three high-level Polisario officials defected to Morocco. Among those who abandoned the front in 1989 was Omar Hadrami, one of the six founders of the Polisario Front in May, 1973, a former member of the Polisario executive committee and a figure of high visibility in the movement for many years.⁶

The next two years could be decisive for the Western Sahara conflict and the Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement. On November 22, 1989, King Hassan announced that a national referendum would be held on December 1 to decide whether to extend the life of the Moroccan Parliament by two years. He explained that the 1990 parliamentary elections should not be held until after a referendum in the Western Sahara, and gave the UN no more than two years to organize a referendum. Failing that, Morocco would "draw the necessary conclusions"—an implied warning that Morocco would organize its own referendum in the disputed territory.⁷ The December 1 referendum was approved by the usual 99 percent majority. The more ominous side of this two-year limit is that the FAR may have its own contingency plan. In the absence of a UN referendum, impatience and frustration may cause the FAR to attack Polisario base camps and headquarters in the Tindouf region of southwest Algeria—thereby setting off a general war with Algeria.

There is disappointment among the Moroccan leadership that the rapprochement with Algeria has not yet produced an acceptable end to the Sahara dispute. Despite loyal Moroccan support for Chadli Bendjedid—especially during the autumn of 1988—Algeria has yet to abandon the Polisario. Still, Morocco shows every sign of pursuing reconciliation with Algeria—as long as Bendjedid is in power. Morocco is in a very strong military position and is unlikely to make substantive concessions to the UN and the Polisario. King Hassan believes that time and diplomacy are on his side in North Africa, and he can afford to wait. In the meantime,

⁶See the interview with Omar Hadrami in *Jeune Afrique*, no. 1503 (October 23, 1989), pp. 19–34. The author interviewed Hadrami in Algiers in January, 1979.

⁷*Middle East International*, no. 364 (December 1, 1989), p. 13.

Morocco will continue to voice public support for a referendum to avoid the appearance of intransigence at the international level. At the regional level, the Arab Maghrebi Union (UMA), created in February, 1989, will strengthen the Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement at the expense of the Polisario. The King perceives that his policy of reconciliation with Algeria, buttressed by the UMA, will weaken Algerian resolve to back the front in the long run.

The less predictable element in the medium term—and one of great importance—is the balance of political forces in Algeria. The FLN contains individuals who have repeatedly expressed their opposition to Chadli Bendjedid's efforts to reform and liberalize the economic and political structures inherited from the era of Houari Boumedienne (1965–1978). Key members of this hardline faction were reelected to the FLN central committee at the extraordinary party congress held in early December, 1989. Bendjedid apparently made a comeback at the end of December when no hardliners were included in the FLN Politburo.

It is not likely that Bendjedid's hardline opponents will increase their influence, which would mean greater Algerian support for the Polisario and would halt progress toward a political settlement of the Sahara conflict. It would increase the danger of a war between Morocco and Algeria—a war that both governments have avoided at all costs for the past 15 years.

The more likely possibility is that Chadli Bendjedid will consolidate his position. With Bendjedid firmly in control, there might be a face-saving solution of the Sahara dispute. This would involve a referendum, perhaps in 1990, based on the 1974 Spanish census. If Omar Hadrami's figures of "less than 30,000" Sahrawis in the Polisario-run camps is credible, this is a referendum that Morocco could expect to win.⁸

Once Morocco and Algeria agree on the terms of a Sahara settlement—with or without Polisario consent—there is always a possibility that such a settlement might later unravel. Indeed, the two countries often make agreements that are not realized. The Moroccans, in particular, have a tendency to think the worst of their neighbors' actions and motives and to see the Algerians as untrustworthy.

Nevertheless, there is little chance that a Sahara solution, once reached, will fall apart. It has taken the key players a long time to move toward a solution. And both sides would go to some lengths to protect this agreement against interference by a disgruntled third party like Libya. ■

⁸*Jeune Afrique*, op. cit., p. 30. Though Hadrami's figure may be suspect, it is consistent with the author's estimate that between one-third and one-half of the Sahrawi population left the Western Sahara in 1975–1976 in the wake of the Moroccan takeover.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 173)

MISCELLANEOUS

A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET, 1913–1951: THE DEMISE OF THE LAMAIST STATE. By Melvyn C. Goldstein. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 843 pages, glossary, references and index, \$85.00.)

Couched between the giants, India and China, Tibet has been too little exposed and too long neglected as a subject for American audiences. This weighty and comprehensive history of Tibet in the first half of the twentieth century should go a long way toward giving Tibet the equal time it deserves. This volume is a nonpartisan history based on sources from all quarters (including diplomatic records from India, England and the United States, Tibetan eyewitness accounts and interviews with Tibetans)—not an addition to the continuing polemic on whether Tibet is or is not a historical part of China.

Melvyn Goldstein's goal is not to support one side or the other in this controversy; instead, he recounts the historical process that led to "the demise, in 1951, of the de facto independent Lamaist State." He contends that although external actors precipitated the fall of independent Tibet, internal dynamics created the conditions that enabled external actors, mainly China, to succeed.

Chief among the factors contributing to Chinese military success was the fact that Tibet was not prepared for fighting. Tibet's religious leadership (and thus its dominant force) stubbornly resisted the military modernization that might have enabled Tibet to resist Chinese domination. Other contributing factors were the legacy of British influence articulated in the Simla Convention of 1914 (the text of which is included as an appendix) and the American mishandling of the Tibetan situation in 1950–1951.

Goldstein is to be commended for staying above the fray in this welcome addition to the study of modern Asia. D.E.S.

ALSO RECEIVED

COALITION STRATEGIES OF MARXIST PARTIES. Edited by Trond Gilberg. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989. 323 pages, notes and index, \$52.50.)

FIRES ALL AROUND THE HORIZON: THE U.N.'S UPHILL BATTLE TO PRESERVE THE PEACE. By Max Harrelson. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989. 259 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$42.95, cloth; \$16.95, paper.) ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of February, 1990, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

East European Meeting

Feb. 4—The foreign ministers of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland meet in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss the future of Europe. Among the issues debated are German reunification and the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

European Community (EC)

Feb. 20—Great Britain ends its ban on new investments in South Africa, breaking with the other members of the EC, who continue to refuse further investment in South Africa.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

(See also *China*)

Feb. 6—The World Bank approves 2 loans totaling \$360 million for Poland, the first part of a \$2.5-billion package.

Least Developed Countries Meeting

Feb. 12—Representatives of the 42 least developed countries meet in Dacca, Bangladesh, to find ways to persuade the world's richer countries that their people need assistance; the UN says that average per capita income in these 42 countries is only about U.S.\$200 a year.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 12—NATO and the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meet in Ottawa to discuss German reunification and "open skies" reconnaissance flights over each other's territory. West Germany and the Soviet Union agree on procedures to negotiate a reunification of the 2 Germans.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See *Lebanon*)

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl., Least Developed Countries Meeting*)

Feb. 20—The UN opens a special 4-day session aimed at improving the UN anti-drug-trafficking efforts.

AFGHANISTAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

ALBANIA

Feb. 4—The Central Committee of the Communist party has agreed to allow some change in the degree of authority state enterprises may exercise, but reaffirms its monopoly on power.

ARGENTINA

(See *U.K., Great Britain*)

BOLIVIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

BULGARIA

(See also *Intl., East European Meeting*)

Feb. 1—Prime Minister Georgi Atanossov and the Cabinet resign after an emergency 2-day party congress on reforming

the Communist party. At the congress, General Secretary Petar Mladenov invited the opposition to join the government, but the opposition coalition rejected the offer.

Feb. 2—Mladenov is removed from office at the emergency party congress but will remain head of state. Aleksandur Lilov is his successor as general secretary.

Feb. 3—Andrei Lukanov, an economist and former minister of foreign trade, is unanimously elected Prime Minister by the Parliament.

Feb. 8—Lukanov announces a new Cabinet composed entirely of Communists, after he fails to form a coalition government.

Feb. 11—A group of intellectuals forms a new party, the Alternative Socialist party.

CAMBODIA

Feb. 22—East European diplomats say that several thousand Vietnamese troops and military advisers returned to Cambodia in October, 1989, and that they are assisting the Hun Sen government defend 2 key cities against the Khmer Rouge.

Feb. 23—According to radio reports, the government has retaken Svay Chek from the Khmer Rouge.

CANADA

(See *Czechoslovakia*)

CHILE

Feb. 2—President Patricio Aylwin agrees to give General Augusto Pinochet a ceremonial role in the inauguration of the new government on March 11. Pinochet will give up the presidency but not his army command.

CHINA

(See also *U.K., Hong Kong; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 1—Foreign diplomats in Beijing say that Prime Minister Li Peng will visit the Soviet Union in April. He will be the highest-level Chinese official to visit the Soviet Union since Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China in May, 1989.

Feb. 6—*The New York Times* reports that the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) has resumed lending to China with a \$9.75-million loan to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation; this is the first loan by a Western lending agency since June, 1989.

Feb. 7—China issues new restrictions on students who wish to study abroad, including a requirement that they pay a large deposit to the government if they want to avoid working for 5 years before their departure.

Feb. 8—The World Bank and the Ex-Im Bank say that they have approved loans to China. The World Bank's \$30-million loan is for earthquake relief; the Ex-Im Bank's \$23.1-million loan is for the Shanghai transportation system.

Feb. 14—The *People's Daily*, the official party newspaper, announces that the entire leadership of the People's Armed Police, the internal security force, will be replaced.

Feb. 19—Xinhua, the official news agency, reports that in a speech reportedly given on February 15, Prime Minister Li warned ethnic minorities against advocating independence and said that "separatist activities" should be crushed.

COLOMBIA(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**COSTA RICA**

Feb. 4—Rafael A. Calderón Jr. of the Social Christian party wins the presidential election by a narrow margin. He will succeed President Oscar Arias Sánchez, who is not permitted to run for a 2nd term. More than 80 percent of the electorate votes.

CUBA(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 6—Western diplomats say that because the Soviet Union has fallen behind in its grain shipments to Cuba, Cuban President Fidel Castro has been forced to reduce the bread ration and raise some food prices.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA(See also *Intl, East European Meeting; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 6—Petr Pithart, a leader of the Civic Forum opposition group, is appointed Prime Minister of the Czech republic, replacing Frantisek Pitra, who resigned in January.

Feb. 18—President Vaclav Havel leaves for a trip to Iceland, Canada and the U.S.

EGYPT

Feb. 4—On a highway east of Cairo, an Israeli tour bus is attacked by assailants with guns and grenades; 8 people are killed and 17 are wounded.

Feb. 5—A group identified with an extremist faction of the fundamentalist Islamic Holy War claims responsibility for the February 4 attack on the Israeli tour bus.

EL SALVADOR(See also *Nicaragua; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 11—After fighting between Farabundo Martí Liberation Front guerrillas and Salvadoran government troops, the Salvadoran Air Force bombs a settlement of former refugees, killing at least 6 people.

Feb. 23—Former President José Napoleón Duarte, who left office in June, 1989, dies of liver cancer.

ETHIOPIA

Feb. 8—The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) begins a military offensive to force Ethiopian government troops out of Eritrea. For the past 9 months there has been an unofficial cease-fire.

Feb. 10—The EPLF says it has captured the port of Massawa on the Red Sea, Eritrea's main port, cutting off several supply routes.

Feb. 15—*The New York Times* reports that Western officials say the civil war is undermining relief efforts in drought-stricken areas. They warn of famine.

GERMANY, EAST(See also *Intl, East European Meeting, NATO; Germany, West; Poland; U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 1—Prime Minister Hans Modrow announces his plan for German unification in slow stages and a neutral future state. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl rejects German neutrality.

Feb. 5—Parliament votes to add 8 opposition Cabinet ministers in accordance with the power-sharing arrangements reached in January. Elections are moved up to March 18.

Feb. 15—Former General Secretary Erich Honnecker admits responsibility for election fraud in the May 7, 1989, elections but denies any criminal intent.

GERMANY, WEST(See also *Intl, East European Meeting, NATO; Germany, East; Poland; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 3—Chancellor Helmut Kohl rejects Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's proposal that German reunification be subject to an international referendum.

Feb. 6—Kohl calls for a single currency for both East Germany and West Germany, proposing that East Germany adopt the West German mark.

Feb. 7—The West German government establishes a "German unity" committee to study monetary union and political reunification of the 2 Germans.

Feb. 10—In Moscow, Kohl meets with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Feb. 14—West Germany approves a supplementary budget of \$4.1 billion, most of which is to aid the failing East German economy until reunification can be achieved.

GREECE

Feb. 12—After major party leaders fail to agree, the coalition government is dissolved and an interim government is formed to rule until general elections on April 8.

HUNGARY(See also *Intl, East European Meeting*)

Feb. 1—Talks open between Hungary and the Soviet Union to set a schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. About 50,000 Soviet troops are currently stationed in Hungary.

Feb. 9—The Vatican reopens formal ties with Hungary.

ICELAND(See *Czechoslovakia*)**INDIA**(See also *Nepal*)

Feb. 1—In Kashmir, the government relaxes curfew restrictions, imposed on January 20 after separatist riots began.

Feb. 5—Indian soldiers shoot civilian demonstrators from Pakistan who entered Kashmir, wounding about 13 people. About 4,000 anti-India demonstrators were massed at the Jammu-Kashmir border in support of the Kashmiri insurgency.

Feb. 10—In Srinagar, 8 bombs explode after a fire in a shopping center. Some officials believe that the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front was responsible. No injuries are reported.

Feb. 19—In Jammu and Kashmir, the state legislature is dissolved in preparation for possible elections. The legislature was suspended in January after its highest elected official resigned.

Feb. 23—In Srinagar, over 400,000 demonstrators demand Kashmiri independence.

IRAQ(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**ISRAEL**(See also *Egypt; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 12—Ariel Sharon resigns as trade minister as part of an effort to pressure Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to adopt harsher policies in the occupied territories.

Feb. 22—The Labor party announces that if the Likud party does not accept its compromise regarding negotiation with the Palestinians by March 7, Labor will withdraw from the coalition government.

Feb. 27—Israel and Poland resume diplomatic relations after a lapse of 23 years.

Feb. 28—Five Likud party members in Parliament resign from the party to form a new opposition party.

IVORY COAST

Feb. 24—After a week of anti-government protests, clashes between demonstrators and police become violent.

JAPAN

Feb. 2—For the 1st time in 30 years, candidates from 5 political parties hold an election debate in Tokyo.

Feb. 19—In elections for the lower house of Parliament (Diet), the ruling Liberal Democratic party's majority is reduced, but remains large enough to form a government. The Japan Socialist party makes significant gains, mostly at the expense of other opposition parties.

Feb. 20—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Corporation and General Dynamics Corporation say they have agreed on the technology transfer involved in producing the FSX fighter plane.

Feb. 21—The government says it will offer tax deductions to companies that make charitable donations to American institutions.

Feb. 22—Japan approves a proposal made by U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to reduce U.S. forces in East Asia and the Pacific by 10 percent.

Feb. 24—In separate announcements, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and U.S. President George Bush say that they will meet in early March to discuss trade issues.

Feb. 25—The Tokyo Stock Exchange suffers its most severe fall in 3 years; the Nikkei stock average falls 5 percent today, after a 6.9 percent fall last week.

Feb. 27—The government intervenes to stabilize the stock market after a 4.5 percent dip on February 26 in addition to the previous declines.

Feb. 28—Toshiki Kaifu is formally reelected Prime Minister; a new Cabinet is announced.

KENYA

Feb. 16—The burned remains of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko are discovered near Koru 3 days after he disappeared.

Feb. 23—After Ouko's funeral, anti-government riots break out in Nairobi and Kisumu.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 10—Anti-government student demonstrations erupt in Seoul, protesting the new conservative coalition. The students throw rocks and firebombs at riot police.

LEBANON

Feb. 1—After 3 days of fighting, rival Christian factions led by General Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea agree to a truce.

Feb. 2—The truce collapses as a new offensive is launched by Lebanese Army units loyal to Aoun against the Lebanese Forces under Geagea.

Feb. 6—In a coastal town north of Beirut, Aoun's forces defeat Geagea's troops. Fighting continues in East Beirut.

Feb. 7—Aoun agrees to a cease-fire, but says that the Lebanese Forces must disarm or join the regular armed forces. Geagea says his troops will not yield.

Feb. 10—Fighting between rival Christian forces resumes.

Feb. 25—The PLO offers to act as mediator between the rival Christian militias.

MEXICO

Feb. 15—The *New York Times* reports that after more than 100 years of estrangement, Mexico and the Vatican are preparing to reopen diplomatic relations.

MONGOLIA

Feb. 11—A Mongolian official says that many Mongolians have been inspired by the Soviet Communist party's relinquishment of a monopoly on power. In the 5th demonstration called by the Mongolian Democratic Union, 4,000-5,000 prodemocracy demonstrators rally in Ulan Bator.

MYANMAR

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

NAMIBIA

Feb. 9—Parliament votes on a new constitution that bans the death penalty, creates a multiparty system and assures human rights. The constitution will become legal on March 21, after Namibia is officially independent.

Feb. 16—Sam Nujoma, who spent 30 years in exile and helped found SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organization), is elected President. He will be sworn in on March 21.

NEPAL

Feb. 18—In the 1st demonstration against absolute monarchy in Nepal in 11 years, several thousand prodemocracy demonstrators protest in Katmandu. Banned political parties call for a general strike on February 19.

Feb. 22—A joint communiqué issued by Indian and Nepalese negotiators indicates that India and Nepal have apparently reached an agreement to end their year-long trade and transit dispute. The final agreement is to be signed in March.

NICARAGUA

Feb. 9—The National Assembly pardons 1,200 contra rebels and members of the former Nicaraguan National Guard; they are released from prison.

Feb. 21—Over 100,000 Sandinista supporters rally in Managua in the largest political demonstration in Nicaragua's history.

Feb. 23—President Daniel Ortega Saavedra says that he will not provide arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador if he is reelected, calling the Salvadoran government "legitimate." U.S. officials have said that this is a necessary precondition to restoring normal relations with the U.S.

Feb. 25—The 1st free and contested elections are held, with international observers. Voter turnout is reported high.

Feb. 26—Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the leader of the opposition coalition, wins the national elections by a wide margin, unexpectedly defeating Ortega; Ortega says he will respect the result of the election. She will be inaugurated on April 25.

Feb. 28—Ortega declares an immediate cease-fire with the contra rebels; Chamorro urges the contras to disband promptly.

PAKISTAN

(See also *India*)

Feb. 7—The Mohajir National Movement stages a general strike in Karachi.

PANAMA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

PERU

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

PHILIPPINES

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 19—As U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney arrives in Manila to meet with Philippine Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos, demonstrators clash with police in front of the U.S. embassy and at Clark Air Force Base. President Corazon

Aquino has refused to meet Cheney because of cuts in U.S. payments for U.S. military bases in the Philippines.

Feb. 27—Former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile is arrested on charges of complicity in the failed coup attempt against Aquino in December, 1989.

POLAND

(See also *Intl, East European Meeting, World Bank; Israel*)

Feb. 4—Lech Walesa says that in April he will probably step down as leader of the Solidarity trade union. He denies that he is resigning in order to run for President.

Feb. 16—In Paris, Poland's 17 creditor nations, the so-called Paris Club, extend deadlines for some \$9.4 billion in payment deadlines for Poland's debt in order to stretch interest and principal payments over a 14-year period.

Feb. 21—Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki says that Poland's pre-World War II western boundaries should be clearly defined before German reunification takes place and that Soviet troops should remain in Poland.

ROMANIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 1—The ruling Council of National Salvation agrees to relinquish its monopoly on power and to join a coalition government until elections in May.

Feb. 2—Four senior officials from the government of deposed leader Nicolae Ceausescu are convicted on charges of complicity in genocide and are sentenced to life imprisonment.

Feb. 3—The Council of National Salvation votes to dissolve itself to allow the establishment of a new multiparty coalition government, the Council of National Unity.

Feb. 4—Silviu Brucan resigns as leader of the Council of National Salvation. He says he is resigning because "he has accomplished his mission" to restore democracy.

Feb. 5—Interim President Ion Iliescu signs a decree legalizing free enterprise, allowing a firm to employ up to 20 workers; the government will retain ownership of large industrial plants.

Feb. 18—In Bucharest, protesters take over the Foreign Ministry building to support their demands for the ouster of officials with any Communist party ties and for an end to communism; soldiers are called in to restore order.

Feb. 21—Defense Minister Colonel General Victor Stanculescu says that the Securitate (secret police) have been disbanded.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, EC; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 2—President F. W. de Klerk lifts a 30-year ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and promises to free ANC leader Nelson Mandela soon, after 27 years in prison.

Feb. 5—In a black township near Johannesburg, violent clashes between police and anti-apartheid demonstrators leave at least 18 people injured.

Feb. 11—Mandela leaves prison. In his first public remarks in 27 years, he urges the international community not to lift its sanctions against South Africa because to do so "would be to run the risk of aborting the process toward ending apartheid."

Feb. 12—Mandela says that negotiations on a new constitution that gives blacks political rights can begin soon even though the state of emergency is still in force and all political prisoners have not been released.

Feb. 16—ANC leaders in Lusaka, Zambia, say they will send a delegation to South Africa to meet with de Klerk.

Feb. 21—A leading newspaper reports that Defense Minister Magnus A. Malan has known since 1987 of police "hit squads" that have killed apartheid opponents.

Feb. 22—De Klerk says his government is gaining international

support because Mandela and other ANC leaders advocate "archaic policies," referring to Mandela's support of guerrilla struggle and the nationalization of economic assets.

Feb. 25—In Durban, Mandela tells his followers to stop the factional warfare in Natal province's black townships.

Feb. 27—Mandela arrives in Lusaka for talks with exiled members of the ANC.

SWEDEN

Feb. 15—Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson submits the resignation of his Social Democratic government after its defeat in Parliament on economic issues.

Feb. 26—In a 175-101 vote with 59 abstentions, Parliament confirms Carlsson as Prime Minister.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, East European Meeting, NATO; China; Cuba; Germany, West; Hungary; Mongolia; Poland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 1—Representatives from 4 Soviet republics meet in Riga, Latvia, to discuss an end to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

Feb. 2—Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze recommends that the issue of German reunification be subject to an international referendum.

Feb. 4—More than 100,000 demonstrators march to the Kremlin calling for democracy and demanding that the Communist party surrender its monopoly on power.

Feb. 5—At the meeting of the Communist party Central Committee, President Mikhail Gorbachev urges the party to give up its constitutionally guaranteed monopoly on power and accept a multiparty system. He also proposes a reorganization of the party structure. Hard-liners at the session argue against the changes.

Feb. 7—The 250-member Central Committee ends its 3-day meeting with an agreement to end the Communist party's monopoly on power.

Feb. 9—Gorbachev agrees to U.S. President George Bush's proposed reduction of troops in Europe but only if both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have equal levels of forces.

The Lithuanian parliament approves a resolution calling the Soviet Union's 1940 annexation of Lithuania "unlawful and invalid" and asking for negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Feb. 11—50,000 rally in Kishinev, Moldavia, to demand greater autonomy.

Feb. 12—In Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the government declares a state of emergency after riots erupt in reaction to rumors that Armenian refugees are receiving housing preference. Soviet officials say the rumors are false.

Feb. 13—Officials in Dushanbe say the situation is "completely out of the control" of Tajikistan authorities and Soviet troops. Soviet television says 37 people have been killed in the continued rioting.

Feb. 15—The Latvian parliament votes 177 to 48 for a declaration saying that it is necessary to work for Latvian independence.

In Tajikistan, Communist party leaders and the government resign, according to a report from Tass, the official news agency.

Feb. 21—Gorbachev agrees to the right of the two Germanys to unite but affirms the Soviet Union's "inalienable right" to insure that there is no danger to the security of the Soviet Union.

Feb. 25—In a vote on February 24, reported today, Lithuanian voters give 72 of 90 seats in their parliament to a party that proposes to end Communist rule and to seek independence.

Feb. 26—In Moscow, Gorbachev and Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel agree on a schedule for the withdrawal of

Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia; all 73,500 Soviet troops will be withdrawn by July 1, 1991.

Feb. 27—By a vote of 306 to 65, the Supreme Soviet decides to send Gorbachev's proposals for greater presidential authority to the Congress of People's Deputies to be legislated into law at an emergency session March 12-13.

Feb. 28—The Supreme Soviet agrees to Gorbachev's proposal to restore family farming through leasing; the ban on private land ownership is maintained.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl, EC*)

Feb. 15—After 2 days of talks in Madrid, Great Britain and Argentina agree to resume diplomatic relations that were broken in 1982 when the 2 countries were at war over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

Hong Kong

Feb. 16—In Beijing, the Basic Law that will serve as Hong Kong's constitution after 1997 (when control of Hong Kong reverts to China) is ratified; in Hong Kong, several thousand students protest the ratification.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Feb. 6—President George Bush gives his Economic Report to Congress; he calls for more federal involvement in child care, education, basic research and protection of the environment, and says that "well-designed regulation" can be an asset. He says he aims at achieving "the highest possible rate of sustainable economic growth."

Feb. 9—Daniel Kearney, the president of the oversight board of the Resolution Trust Corporation (the agency formed to oversee the bail-out of the savings and loan industry), resigns, saying he has not been given enough authority for the job.

Feb. 18—Postmaster General Anthony Frank announces that by summer, 1990, the Post Office will end its commitment to overnight delivery of first-class mail to millions of patrons and will concentrate on the consistency and reliability of delivery instead.

Feb. 23—President Bush selects Arthur A. Fletcher as chairman of the Civil Rights Commission.

Economy

Feb. 2—Regulators from the federal Office of Thrift Supervision seize Florida's largest savings and loan association, Sentrust Savings Bank, accusing its chairman, David L. Paul, of operating irresponsibly and dissipating funds.

Feb. 9—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 1.8 percent in January, the largest rise in a single month in 15 years.

Feb. 16—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for December was \$7.2 billion, the smallest deficit in 5 years; the deficit for 1989 was \$108.6 billion.

Feb. 21—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 1.1 percent in January, the largest advance in over 7 years.

Feb. 28—In a revised report, the Commerce Department reveals that the nation's gross national product (GNP) grew at an annual rate of 0.9 percent in the 4th quarter of 1989.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Czechoslovakia; Japan; Nicaragua; Philippines; U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 1—Meeting with Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani, President Bush reiterates U.S. support for the Salvadoran government. The State Department recommends increasing

economic aid for El Salvador by about \$50 million, from \$130.6 million in 1990 to \$180 million in 1991.

Feb. 3—On the grounds of national security, President Bush nullifies the sale of Mamco Manufacturing, an airplane parts manufacturer, to a purchasing agency of the Chinese government.

The Justice Department says that although former Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega will be treated as a prisoner of war, he can still be prosecuted on drug-trafficking charges.

Feb. 3—A confidential State Department report states that there were severe and widespread violations of human rights in China and Tibet in 1989, particularly after the military crack-down in Beijing. The report is to be published on February 21.

Feb. 6—In Czechoslovakia, Secretary of State James Baker 3d offers a U.S. aid package to assist in efforts to establish a free-market democracy.

Feb. 8—Baker begins negotiations in Moscow, with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze over arms control and ways to end the conflict in Afghanistan.

Feb. 9—Baker ends 2 days of negotiations in Moscow over troop levels in Europe; he and Shevardnadze agree in principle on banning chemical weapons and progress toward a treaty on strategic nuclear weapons.

Feb. 10—In Moscow, Baker appears before the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet and discusses U.S. foreign policy.

Feb. 11—President Bush welcomes Mandela's release and invites Mandela to visit him.

Baker ends his visit to East Europe with a trip to Romania; he has promised \$80 million in cattlefeed and butter.

Feb. 12—President Bush tells a Washington, D.C., news conference that "We're going to stay with our proposal" that the U.S. keep 30,000 soldiers in West Europe; he will not agree to Gorbachev's proposal for an equal number of Soviet and U.S. troops.

In Washington, D.C., U.S. and Soviet trade representatives begin talks aimed at ending U.S. trade restrictions against the Soviet Union that have been in force for almost 50 years.

President Bush says he is not yet willing to lift U.S. sanctions on South Africa.

Feb. 13—In Ottawa, Shevardnadze tells Baker that the Soviet Union will agree to President Bush's proposal that the U.S. maintain 30,000 troops in West Europe in addition to the proposed 195,000 in Central Europe previously agreed on. This effectively reverses Gorbachev's position that troop levels on both sides must be equal.

Feb. 14—Defense Secretary Dick Cheney begins a 10-day Asian tour to discuss the possible reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea and the Philippines, as well as other military matters.

Feb. 15—In South Korea, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Sang Hoon tells Cheney that his country will agree to the withdrawal of 5,000 noncombatant troops out of the 43,000 U.S. soldiers in South Korea.

President Bush meets in Cartagena with the Presidents of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru to devise ways to control international drug trafficking.

Feb. 19—The State Department charges that the Soviet Union has bowed to Arab pressure and has refused to permit direct flights for Soviet Jews from Moscow to Israel, a plan that was suggested by the U.S.

Feb. 20—In its annual report on human rights, the State Department criticizes Israel for violations in the occupied territories and castigates Palestinian violence and the human rights records of Iraq, Cuba and Myanmar.

Czechoslovakia's President Havel meets with President Bush, who promises new U.S. trade benefits for Czechoslovakia.

Feb. 21—Havel addresses a joint session of Congress and says that the best way for the U.S. to aid his country and East Europe is to help the Soviet Union on the "immensely complicated" road to democracy.

Feb. 24—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl arrives at Camp David for negotiations with President Bush over German reunification and the future of West Europe.

Feb. 25—President Bush and Kohl end 2 days of talks; Kohl says that there is no reason for anyone to fear the political or the economic strength of a united Germany; the 2 also agree that a united Germany should be a member of NATO.

Labor and Industry

(See also *Japan*)

Feb. 8—The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) orders New York Telephone Company and New England Telephone Company to pay \$1.4 million in fines for overcharging customers some \$35 million in inflated charges it paid for equipment between 1984 and 1988.

Feb. 13—The Chrysler Corporation reports a \$664-million loss in the 4th quarter of 1989 and a profit decline of 65.8 percent for the whole year.

The brokerage firm Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. starts to liquefy its assets after defaulting on \$100 million in loans; its parent company, Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc., files for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.

Feb. 15—The Ford Motor Company reports a profit decline of 27.5 percent for 1989 and the General Motors Corporation reports a 1989 profit decline of 13.2 percent.

Feb. 20—According to Wall Street executives, Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. paid out as much as \$350 million in bonuses to top executives in December a few weeks before the firm declared bankruptcy.

The United Mine Workers ratify a new contract and end their 10-month strike against Pittston Coal Group.

Feb. 27—In Anchorage, a U.S. grand jury indicts the Exxon Corporation and its shipping subsidiary on 5 criminal counts as a result of the oil spill into Prince William Sound on March 24, 1989. Almost 11 million gallons of crude oil were spilled.

Legislation

Feb. 1—*The New York Times* reports that on January 30, the Senate unanimously voted to repeal a provision of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952; the provision excluded foreign visitors on the basis of their political beliefs. The House approved the repeal in November, 1989.

Feb. 7—In a voice vote, the House and the Senate approve \$42 million in emergency aid for Panama and remove many trade sanctions.

Political Scandal

Feb. 1—Attorney General Dick Thornburgh says he will appoint a special prosecutor to investigate fraud charges against former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel R. Pierce Jr.

Feb. 2—The Justice Department urges U.S. District Court Judge Harold H. Greene to delay the February 5 date when former President Ronald Reagan is to hand over his private diaries to the court; the diaries are to be used in the Iran-contra (arms for hostages) trial of the former national security adviser, John M. Poindexter.

Feb. 5—Ronald Reagan's attorneys file a motion asking Judge Greene to cancel his order requesting the former President to hand over his diaries. Judge Greene orders Reagan to submit videotaped testimony for use in Poindexter's trial.

James H. Hamernick, an official of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, declines to testify before

the House subcommittee investigating the agency's activities during the Reagan administration, citing his 5th Amendment rights. He is the 5th HUD official to refuse to testify.

The trial of U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar on racketeering charges begins; he is the 1st federal judge ever charged with violating the federal racketeering statute.

Feb. 9—Former President Reagan's attorneys say that he will provide videotaped testimony at Poindexter's trial.

Feb. 16—Reagan begins his testimony about his role in the Iran-contra affair under oath in a Los Angeles courtroom closed to the public; his testimony is videotaped.

Feb. 22—Reagan denies that he ever instructed Poindexter or other individuals to violate U.S. law; he claims no knowledge of the involvement of his aides in the Iran-contra affair.

Science and Space

Feb. 5—Speaking to an intergovernmental panel on climate change under the auspices of the UN, President Bush asks for global action to combat global warming, but warns against policies that interfere with economic growth.

Supreme Court

Feb. 20—The Court rules 7 to 2 to reverse a lower court ruling; it holds that parents under court supervision for child abuse must produce the child on court order even if doing so will result in evidence that incriminates the parents.

Feb. 21—The Court rules 7 to 2 to uphold a lower court ruling that the Office of Management and Budget overstepped its authority in blocking a Labor Department regulation requiring all employers to warn workers of possible exposure to hazardous conditions on the job.

Feb. 27—Overruling a lower court decision, the Court rules 6 to 3 that under specific safeguards prison officials may forcibly treat mentally ill prisoners with anti-psychotic drugs without prior court permission.

Feb. 28—Ruling 5 to 4, the Court overrules a lower court; it rules that the U.S. constitution does not prevent U.S. law enforcement agents, without warrants, from searching and seizing property belonging to foreigners in foreign countries; U.S. citizens retain their 4th Amendment protection.

Ruling 5 to 4, the Court upholds Pennsylvania's death penalty statute.

VATICAN

(See *Hungary; Mexico*)

VIETNAM

(See *Cambodia*)

YUGOSLAVIA

Feb. 1—The government sends troops, tanks and warplanes to Kosovo province, where ethnic Albanian violence continues for a second week.


Feb. 4—The Communist party of the Slovenian republic declares its independence of the Yugoslav Communist party; its president says that Slovenia is not seeking to secede from Yugoslavia, but wants to establish a confederation with less central power.

Feb. 5—The president of the Serbian republic, Slobodan Milosevic, says he will send Serbs to take over Kosovo province, where ethnic violence continues. Serbia controls Kosovo administratively, but only 10 percent of the people in Kosovo are ethnic Serbs.

ZAMBIA

(See *South Africa*)

Erratum: In our February, 1990, issue the volume number was incorrect; the issue is volume 89, number 545.



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North Africa

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